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This paper describes the real sector privatization program in Colombia during the nineties and puts that policy in
the context of  general market deregulation and promotion of  private investment in the provision of  public infrastruc-
ture and domiciliary public services strategy. The paper evaluates the privatization program in manufacturing and
power sector as case studies. It follows the ex-post measuring and econometric analysis of  a set of  operative and
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a Data Envelope Analysis technique based on a sample of 33 plants that count for 85% of the installed capacity in
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RESUMEN
El artículo describe el programa de privatización en el sector real de la economía colombiana durante los años
noventa y ubica esta política en un contexto de desregulación de mercados y promoción de la inversión privada en la
oferta de infraestructura pública y servicios públicos domiciliarios. El artículo evalúa el programa de privatización
de los sectores manufactureros y de generación de energía eléctrica. Se hacen mediciones ex-post y análisis econométrico
del desempeño de las firmas privatizadas. En el sector manufacturero la muestra analizada está compuesta por 30
firmas manufactureras de gran tamaño, donde el Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI) era socio fundador. Los
principales resultados sugieren que estas firmas mantuvieron un comportamiento pro-cíclico relativo a su principal
competidor privado, y desestimaron planes drásticos de reestructuración operativa. Para el grupo de firmas de
generación de energía el artículo estudia el impacto de la reforma regulatoria en el proceso de entrada al mercado,
estructura de propiedad, competencia de mercado y eficiencia productiva. La medición de eficiencia productiva usa
la técnica de Data Envelope Análisis para 33 plantas que representan el 85% de la capacidad instalada en la
generación térmica de energía eléctrica. La muestra está compuesta por plantas que estaban en funcionamiento
antes de la reforma y las entrantes que comenzaron su operación comercial después de la reforma. Los resultados
sugieren que los niveles de evidencia en la generación térmica han mejorado después de la reforma y que la política
regulatoria ha tenido un efecto positivo en la eficiencia productiva.
Palabras clave: privatización, reestructuración industrial, sector eléctrico colombiano y reforma regulatoria.
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 I. INTRODUCTION
In the early nineties, the Colombian government began an economic openness program
through the promotion of market competition and institutional deregulation. The economic
openness package included major structural reforms in i) foreign trade policy, ii) exchange rate
regime, iii) capital flow controls, iv) central bank independence, v) privatization programs, vi)
labor legislation, vii) foreign investment legislation, and vii) social security and pension regimes.1
Historically, the size of the state in Colombia has been below the average of other Latin Ameri-
can economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. However, revenues from privatization
had an important impact on the government short-run fiscal policy, since during the 1994-1998
period, a majority of investment in social programs was financed with these resources. The
privatization program in the real sector was dominated by the selling of assets in the power sector,
natural gas transportation, manufacturing, and to a lesser degree in the water and sewage sector
during the 1993-1998 period. Regarding telecommunications, the reform has induced new private
investment rather than a property transfer. At the same time, the government undertook an im-
portant public divestment in the financial sector through the selling of FOGAFIN’s equity shares.2
Colombia’s most important institutional and regulatory reform during the nineties took
place in the domiciliary public services sector, where free the private sector was granted free
entry. This implied the setup of modern and independent regulatory commissions for electricity
and natural gas, water and sanitation, and telecommunications. Hence, economic deregulation in
Colombia was part of a comprehensive long-term strategy to promote the new roles of public
and private sectors. However, after a decade of economic openness, this experience has not
been well documented or analyzed on sectoral bases. One example is the study by Spiller &
Guash (1998) about the regulatory process in Latin America, in which they literally skipped the
Colombian experience despite of the advances in public utilities regulation. Furthermore, in the
collective studies of privatization in Latin America such as those by Glade (1996), Baer & Conroy
(1994), and Baer & Birch (1994) one finds that the reference to Colombia is usually limited in
contrast to other Latin American countries.
Despite that absence, one can highlight the papers of Zuleta et. al. (1993), and Montenegro
(1994, 1995) about the privatization process. These papers document in a preliminary manner the
motivations that committed the government to rely on privatization as an economic instrument to
promote market competition, but they do not provide any empirical analysis of ex-post efficiency
 1 The general objectives and the scope of the economic openness program are in the development plan 1990-
1994 [DNP (1991a)]. The main institutional reforms are in the following laws and CONPES documents: i)
foreign control regime (Law 9/1991), ii) foreign trade reform (Law 7/1991), iii) financial reform (Law 45/
1990), iv) new statute of foreign investment (CONPES document - January 22/1991), v) labor reform (Law
50/1990), and vi) privatization of maritime ports (Law 1st /1991). See DNP (1991b).
 2 FOGAFIN is a bail fund for financial institutions, whose objectives are to provide the credit lines for bank’s
capitalization and the savings deposit insurance. It is important to recall that the nationalization of the finan-
cial sector during the 80s was the consequence of several financial crises and the inadequate financial regula-
tion that could not avoided the formation of economic conglomerates. Thus, the privatization and deregulation
of the banking industry had different motives than those linked to the real sector.6 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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performance. Regarding the regulatory reform in network industries, there are the papers of Gutierrez
(1999) on telecommunications and Pombo (2001) on electric utilities. These sectoral-based studies
document the regulatory reforms and present the evolution of some indicators that provide a
partial evaluation of such reforms. Thus, the documentation of Colombia’s privatization programs
and regulatory reforms during the nineties is still an incomplete work that needs empirical evidence
to determine the success in the designing and implementation of such economic policies.
This paper seeks to provide an ex-post performance analysis of the privatization programs based
on a representative sample with emphasis in manufacturing and power plants following the bench-
mark approach of Meggison, Nash, & Randenborgh (1994) and Laporta & Lopes de Silanes (1999).
The objective of the study is therefore two-fold. First it measures several efficiency and performance
indicators with an emphasis on a sample of manufacturing and power plants that were either subject
to privatization, restructured because of the new regulation, or were new entrants beginning opera-
tions under the new regulatory environment. Second, it models the determinants of technical effi-
ciency and other performance variables controlling by industry and plant characteristics, ownership
type and regulatory variables in order to evaluate the role of privatization on plant performance.
The paper is organized in five additional sections. Section 2 provides an analysis of the privatization
program that puts this policy instrument in context within overall deregulation, private investment
involvement in public infrastructure, and promotion of market competition policies. Section 3
specifies the privatization program by economic sector. It begins analyzing the divestiture program
of former IFI enterprises from 1986 to 1997 and highlights some historical facts that put in pers-
pective the role of IFI manufacturing enterprises during the last phase of the import-substituting
industrialization in Colombia. Then it presents a brief summary of the State Oil Company
(ECOPETROL) divestiture program, which bore in the natural gas and regional gasoline distribut-
ing companies. The section ends with an analysis of the regulatory reform of Colombia’s power
sector where privatization was deeply implemented. Section 4 presents the ex-post performance
analysis. It begins with a measurement exercise of a set of performance indicators that provides a
picture of the stylized facts for a sample of former IFI manufacturing firms and power utilities.
Then an evaluation of changes in performance is carried out through testing the null of changes in
the performance variables mean and medians. For the case of power plants, the measure of tech-
nical efficiency is based on the notion of best practice production frontier. Section five presents
the econometric analysis setting estimating equations for firm’s efficiency and profitability indica-
tors controlling by plant characteristics, industry specific variables, ownership structure, and regu-
latory policy related variables. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
II. THE DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA:
AN OVERVIEW
Privatization in Colombia was originally conceived as one instrument for economic deregula-
tion and promotion of market competition. The designing of such program during the nineties
sough to incentive and redirect private investment in public infrastructure and network industries.
In that sense, one might consider multiple dimensions: i) concession contracts, ii) sales contracts,
and iii) sectoral regulatory reforms. Concession contracts are an instrument that seeks to promoteCARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 7
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the involvement of private investment in public works and domiciliary services. Concessions were
virtually abolished in practice since 1930 when nationalizations and direct Government involve-
ment in the market economy became more prevalent. Concessions had been widely used during
the 19th century in railroads, mining, and crude oil exploitation. The economic deregulation policy
of the 90s recovered concessions as an instrument to enhance investment in strategic sectors such
as railroads, ports, airports, and highways. The bases for implementing concessions goes back to
the 1991 Constitutional reform, which introduced new rules for property rights regarding domicili-
ary public services and the development of public infrastructure. The new legislation focused on
the Government’s regulatory role and ordered that it set up a flexible legislation regarding public
contracting and concessions regimes [Law 80 of 1993]. One of the main objectives of the Law was
the introduction of equal treatment in assigning state contracts for private and public firms, as well
as extensions in the length of contracts. In particular, the Law allows the signing of contracts of
more than 20 years. At roughly the same time, the 1990 Government Development Plan was
addressing the new economic agenda: economic deregulation, trade liberalization, and sectoral
regulatory reforms. Afterwards, several CONPES documents, as well as the laws on domiciliary
public services, electric, telecommunication, and privatization set up the specific rules regarding
private investment participation, the regulatory reform of network industries, and set the guideline
for the upcoming privatizations.3
Concession type contracts were applied to public works infrastructure projects such as mari-
time ports, roads construction and maintenance, airports, aqueducts and sewages, railroads and
mobile phone networks. The recent studies of Faimboin et. al. (2001) and Bonilla et. al. (2000)
document the most important concession contracts by economic sector in Colombia. The former
focuses on the contract’s characteristics and the incentive mechanisms, providing a preliminary
assessment. The latter analyzes the evolution of domiciliary public services and the transporta-
tion infrastructure provision in the largest cities of Colombia’s Atlantic coast region. The impor-
tance of the latter case is that concessions have been more active in these cities where previous
poor local governance translated into low-quality domiciliary public services provision for de-
cades before market entry deregulation.
According to the results of those studies and several follow up CONPES documents one can
conclude that concessions have had a narrow scope in their implementation. By 1998 there were
35 concession contracts signed.4 Out of 1400 municipal and rural aqueducts within the country
there were only 4 for water companies and only 3 contracts in airports out of 20 possible. In
Telecommunications there only been concessions in mobile phones. Regarding local phone com-
panies they have implemented joint-venture contracts with private investors for the network
expansion. The same applies with the public long distance carrier —TELECOM. Railroads
3 The National Council for the Economic and Social Policy (Concejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social).
The CONPES documents are: 2648/1993; 2775/1995; and 2929/1997. Law 37 of 1993 rules concessions
contracts for telecommunications, Law 142 of 1994 rules the domiciliary public services reform; Law 143 of
1994 supports the power sector reform; and Law 226 of 1995 specifies the all privatization sales must give an
initial offer to the solidarity sector, which includes former company's worker union, worker associations and
cooperative firms.
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concessions have been limited to cargo transportation mainly with one operating concession-
aire, who depends upon a commercial contract for coal transportation. In fact, in 1998 the
railroad tracks network in operation was only 50% the size of the national network in 1970.5
Despite the above, concessions have been important in promoting private investment in road
maintenance, maritime ports and the building of new gas pipelines.
Privatization schemes in turn are sale contracts of equity shares from local, regional or
national public institutions stakes in several enterprises among the manufacturing, network utili-
ties, natural gas distribution and banking industry. The bases were stated in the CONPES docu-
ments 2378 (1988) and 2648 (1993), which designed the schedule for public divestiture in public
and mixed capital enterprises and public financial institutions. Table 1 displays a complete list of
the number of contracts of the privatized companies that took place in the real sector during
the 1987-1998. One can conclude that privatization in Colombia in contrast to other Latin
American experiences such as in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru was not a comprehensive
process. Two reasons explain such outcome. First, privatization was designed as a complemen-
tary policy instrument for economic deregulation. In that sense, the role of the public sector was
redirected toward implementing new regulatory schemes, where privatization was intended to
either channel new investments in public infrastructure or ease industrial restructuring pro-
cesses. Second, besides the public utilities there were not too many commercial and industrial
establishments for sale. It is a well-known fact is that the size of the State in Colombia, histori-
cally, has been one of the smallest in the region. Thus, privatization contracts were specific in the
selling of equity shares of mixed capital enterprises in manufacturing, gas and gasoline distribu-
tion, and in lesser degree in services and mining according to data until 1998.
 Privatization in network industries arose as one instrument for promoting market competi-
tion. It came as part of ongoing sectoral regulatory reforms, which pursued to improve industry
efficiency, channel private investment, and deregulate market entry especially in the provision of
domiciliary public services. The power sector has been by far has been the leading sector in
accumulated privatization sales [90%] according to Table 1, followed by sales in manufacturing
[5.1%] and, natural gas transportation and distribution [3.6%]. The following sections turn at-
tention to the privatization program in manufacturing, gas and power sectors respectively.
III. PRIVATIZATION BY SECTORS
3.1 PRIVATIZATION IN MANUFACTURING
The privatization program in manufacturing was centered around the selling of the Instituto de
Fomento Industrial (IFI) shares from its investment portfolio in a set of manufacturing and non-
manufacturing enterprises. This financial institution was founded by the Decree-Law 1157 of 1940
 5 For details, see Faimboin (2001) op cit, and the CONPES documents 2648 (1993), 2775 (1995), 2928 (1997),
and 2929 (1997). The first concession in airports was the construction and maintenance of Bogotá interna-
tional airport second track. Regarding railroads network, there were 3,468 Km in operation in 1970 while in
1997 there were just 1852 Km. The volume of cargo transportation through railroads has risen since 1995
because of the coal exports by Drummond.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 9
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and became a strategic tool for state promotion of industrialization. The Institute’s main objectives
are: i) to provide long-term credits to private enterprises, and ii) to advance risk capital to industrial
investment projects. The Institute’s ordinary resources come from domestic saving through the issue
of certificates of deposit and long-term bonds. In the international market, the institute leverages
loans from multilateral agencies and commercial banks. The role of IFI in creating new manufac-
turing enterprises located in late industries was central during the fifties and sixties. Today’s largest
private capital enterprises in the steel, chemicals, paper, fertilizer, metalworking,
TABLE 1
PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM IN THE REAL SECTOR IN COLOMBIA 1986-1998:
A SKETCH
Num IFI Ecopetrol ROEs Total
Industry Contracts MCEs MCEs and Sate
MOEs Mill USD
Manufacturing 27 yes 2881.1
- Consumer Goods 8 yes 7.3
- Intermediate Goods /3 12 yes 220.8
- Capital Goods 7 yes 60.0
Minning 1/4 yes 3.5
Natural Gas /2 2 yes 205.5
Gasoline Distribution 5 yes 41.2
Fishing 1 yes 1.5
Services 6 yes 6.9
Power Sector 12 yes 5-060.0
Water and Sanitation 1 yes 2.9
Total 58 2.9
Notes: MCE = Mixed capital enterprises; ROE = Regionally owned enterprises; MOE = Municipally owned
enterprises.
/1: Mining: Carbocol is excluded since the sale was done in March 2001.
/2: Refers to the selling of Gas Natural S.A and Promigas S.A
/3: Includes Cerromatoso
Natural Gas Transportation and Distribution: Gas Natural + Promigas
Gasoline Distribution: Terpel companies = Terpel Sabana + Terpel B/manga + Terpel Centro+ Terpel Sur +
Terpel Norte
Power Sector: 1996-1997 Privatization: Betania + Chivor + Tasajero + TermoCartagena + EPSA + EEB
Corelca Privatization: EAtlantico + EBolivar + ESucre+ ECordoba + EMagdalena + ECesar
TEBSA: Overhaul did not imply a selling
Water and Sanitation: Cartagena Aqueduct became as ACUACAR as mixed capital utility
Partners = City of Cartagena (50%) + Aguas de Barcelona (45%) + private investors (5%)
total utility capitalization = USD mill 4.84
Sources: Ecopetrol requested files; IFI requested files; Dager (1999), DNP (1993, 1997), Bonilla (2001), Famboim
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and automobile sectors were former IFI associated companies. IFI’s larger projects were ori-
ented to capital-intensive industries and producers of intermediate materials as an integral part
of Import Substituting Industrialization policy (ISI), which sought to generate a new supply of manu-
factured goods to the domestic market [Prebish (1959), Hirschman (1968)].
The history of the IFI firms constitutes a central piece of Colombia’s industrialization
process during the postwar years. The prime objective according to the Institute’s founding
statutes is to “promote enterprises dedicated to the transformation of domestic raw materials
given that private capital is not able to develop by itself” [Decree-Law 1157/1940]. Thus,
forming mixed-capital enterprises channeled private sector investments in new activities. It
also constituted a guarantee for stability in foreign investment participation. IFI’s founding
statutes are specific in ordering the selling of equity shares once the government considered
the new enterprises were already consolidated in the market. Through that mechanism, IFI
rotates its capital to promote new industrial projects, and exercises the role of supporter rather
than that of a permanent investor. IFI had an active role as financial supporter within the context
of ISI until the mid-seventies when several industrial projects began operations. As a result,
manufacturing firms such as —Acerías Paz del Río, Cementos Boyacá, Colclinker, Compañía Colombiana
Automotriz, Icollantas, Monomeros Colombo-Venezolanos, Propal, Sofasa— among others have been
leading firms near the center of Colombia’s entrepreneurial development. Hence, privatization
has been a traditional financial instrument for the case of IFI and makes it different from
other privatization programs in Latin America because in this case firms in most cases were
mixed capital enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises.
The CONPES document 2378 of 1988 sped up the privatization program of IFI enter-
prises. In that sense, the policy focused on the transfer of assets and left off the Institute’s
new investments. By December of 1987, the Institute had capital shares in 45 manufacturing
and non-manufacturing enterprises. Thirty of them were operating and the others had already
begun a liquidation process. In addition, there were investments in six ongoing projects.6 The
privatization program defined three steps: i) the selection criteria, ii) the stock assessment, and
iii) the method of sale. The selection criteria was to sell equity shares of all operating enter-
prises that were not subject to special legal procedures and ongoing projects that had not
started commercial operations after 3 years of initial disbursements.7 The stock assessment
process sought to determine the commercial value of the firm’s net assets and the single stock
price. The assessment studies took into account several parameters such as company cash
flow present value, asset benchmarking, asset- book values, stock exchange prices, and the
reposition and liquidation costs. In addition, all stocks were listed into the domestic stock
exchange markets as well as at the National Stock Registry Office to provide transparency in the
6 It is important to highlight that there were important transfer of assets to private sector before the privation
program of the nineties. One example was Icollantas were IFI sold its equity shares in 1980 and 1985. The
Institute in 1994 participated in a 20% share of USD 60 million company’s capitalization.
 7 The special legal procedures refers to the following cases: i) companies with property shares from two or more
public institutions, ii) companies with direct investments from foreign government agencies, and iii) companies
with ongoing settlement processes with their lenders. The second case applied at that time to Monomeros because
the Venezuelan government is still a company’s shareholder. For details, see DNP (1988) op. cit.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 11
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process. This element facilitated the purchase of equities from the public and contributed to
property democratization.
Regarding the method of sale the Institute used several bidding procedures such as private
offers to current shareholders, public bids, domestic stock exchange, and preferential offer to
the so-called “solidarity” sector, which is formed mainly by company’s retirement employees and
union workers. From May 1986 to December 1997 there were 38 privatization contracts of the
IFI enterprises. Table 2 displays the summary of the IFI’s sale program. Three comments are
worth mentioning. First, in all cases the share of IFI in the firm’s net worth were less than one
half. This implied that the Institute never set management policies. Moreover, the partnership of
IFI has been oriented since the beginning to promote technology transfers and to enhance an
entrepreneurial base.
Second, the data suggests that the selling process was successful in the sense that stocks’
selling prices were in all cases greater or equal to the pre-privatization stock nominal price.
However, there is no evidence to ascertain if fixed assets were correctly valued before
privatization. Third, the accumulated sale was 300 million US dollars, which reflects that govern-
ment involvement in manufacturing was very small by the end of the eighties. For instance, such
amount represents less than 10% of the privatized value in Colombia’s power sector during
1996-1997, or the sale of the Mexican Telecom Company [TELMEX] in 1990.
3.2 PRIVATIZATION IN NATURAL GAS AND GASOLINE DISTRIBUTION
The privatization program in natural gas transportation and distribution industry as well as
gasoline distribution was centered in the Colombian Petroleum Company —ECOPETROL—8
selling of equity shares of its investment portfolio. Privatization was narrowed to the sale of
those assets that were not directly related with crude oil exploration, transportation, and refine-
ment. ECOPETROL’s main investments were located in complementary industries such as natural
gas transportation and distribution, gasoline stations, pipelines, thermal gas-based power plants,
and other investments in non-oil businesses.9 Table 3 depicts a summary of ECOPETROL
divesture process until mid 1999.
Three comments are worth mentioning. First, the share of ECOPETROL in the privatized
companies was except for Gas Natural, less than 50% at the privatization date. This case, similar to
IFI enterprises implied that firms were not directly subordinated to ECOPETROL guidelines and
managing policies. Moreover, those companies were independent in their investment expansion
8 Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos.
9 For instance, by March 1993 ECOPETROL had equity shares in three domestic investment banks [Corficaldas,
Corfinorte, Corfinanza], one power utility [ESSA], one fertilizer plant [FERTICOL], and one promoting
enterprise [Artesanías de Colombia]. For details, see DNP (1993, op. cit.)12 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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TABLE 2
IFI - PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM 1986-1997
Num. IFI Stock Stock Total Total
Sector Firm Date Stocks Share Nominal Sale Sale Sale Selling
% Value $ Value $ Mill $ Mill USD Method
Fishing COPESCOL Jul-91 147,000 49.0% 1,000 6,505 956.2 1.5 Public Bid
Manuf EMPACA S.A. May-86 357,440 29.2% 10 150 53.6 0.3 Public Bid
Manuf SUCROMILES S.A. May-86 102,709 15.6% 100 2,400 246.5 1.3 Public Bid
Manuf VIKINGOS S.A. Jul-86 7,049,250 35.5% 10 16 112.8 0.6 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf UNICA S.A. Mar-88 1,108,273 3.4% 10 95 105.3 0.4 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf FORJASCOL S.A.           Dec-88 ASSETS 1,699.8 5.7 Public Offer
Manuf SOFASA Feb-89 1,085,648 49.8% 1,000 18,362 19,935.0 52.1 Public Offer
Manuf CICOLSA Mar-90 140,000 17.4% 100 100 14.0 0.0 Private Offer
Manuf AICSA S.A.            Apr-90 1,321,920 49.0% 10 144 190.5 0.4 Public Offer
Manuf ING RISARALDA S.A.  Jul-90 2,307,868 11.7% 100 421 972.4 1.9 Public Offer
Manuf PAPELCOL S.A. Aug-90 ASSETS 16,218.2 32.3 Public Offer
Manuf COLCLINKER S.A.        Oct-90 118,107 15.7% 1,000 16,160 1,908.6 3.8 Private Offer
Manuf RIOCLARO S.A. Dec-90 5,081,585 10.3% 100 430 2,185.1 4.4 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf C.C.A. Dec-90 505,055 0.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 Private Offer
Manuf COSEDA Jun-91 200,000 20.0% 1,000 1,277 255.3 0.4 Private Offer
Manuf ASTIVAR Aug-91 46,500 31.0% 100 2,800 130.2 0.2 Private Offer
Manuf TEXPINAL              Sep-91 22,089,534 32.4% 5 160 3,534.3 5.6 Private Offer
Manuf PROVICA Sep-91 47,160 13.2% 1,000 1,414 66.7 0.1 Private Offer
Manuf CONASTIL Jan-92 1,013,828 59.9% 1,000 1,000 1,013.8 1.5 Private Offer
Manuf FERTICOL Apr-92 129,028 0.7% 10 10 1.3 0.0 Preferencial Offer
Manuf PENNWALT Nov-92 7,739,517 40.7% 10 158 1,222.8 1.8 Private Offer
Manuf FATEXTOL Feb-93 240,001 16.0% 1,000 2,250 540.0 0.8 Domestic Stock Market
Manuf FRIGOPESCA Dec-94 5,708,109 47.4% 100 440 2,511.6 3.2 Public Bid
Manuf INTELSA Apr-95 7,853 15.7% 1,500 16,500 129.6 0.2 Public Offer
Manuf COSECHAR Oct-95 11,954 1.4% 500 695 8.3 0.0 Public Offer
Manuf QUIBI S.A. Apr-96 12,847,611 20.7% 10 45 578.1 0.6 Public Offer
Manuf CERRO MATOSO Feb-97 5,512,803 47.7% 100 28,264 155,813.9 150.3 Pref Offer/Public Bid
Manuf NITROVEN Dec-97 30,000 10.3% 1,000 702,933 21,088.0 20.3 Pref  Offer/Public  Bid
Mining FOSFONORTE S.A. Jan-89 691 1.1% 1,000 1,250 0.9 0.0 Private Offer
Mining FOSFOBOYACA S.A. Feb-90 9,000 6.4% 1,000 1,000 9.0 0.0 Private Offer
Mining PROCARBON Sep-91 35,160 0.1% 100 270 9.5 0.0 Domestic Stock Market
Mining PRODESAL Oct-91 2,351,174 11.6% 100 921 2,164.4 3.5 Domestic Stock Market
Services PROHOTELES S.A. May-86 1,105,201 10.8% 10 39 43.1 0.2 Domestic Stock Market
Services CIAC S.A. Mar-89 103,709 0.5% 10 38 3.9 0.0 Private Offer
Services COLAR LTDA. Aug-89 ASSETS 100.0 0.3 Public Offer
Services CORFERIAS S.A. Oct-89 4,239,005 5.6% 10 65 275.5 0.7 Private Offer
Services CORFIDESARROLLO Sep-93 15,183,107 16.1% 100 217 3,294.7 4.8 Domestic Stock Market





Total Accumulated (Millions) 300
Source: IFI- Requested Files, Dager (1999)
Notes: After 1995 all privatization contracts were subject to Law 226/1995
CCA: equity shares seized by Banco Colombia’s trust fund since 1986
plans, and company wages policy was set independently from ECOPETROL.10 Second, privatization
until mid-1999 was explained by three sales. The most important sale was Gas Natural in May 1997
where the second bid to the strategic private investors was successful. The sale price was three
times greater than the bid base price. The bid followed a simultaneous first price auction within the
three stock markets of the country.11 Third, the gasoline network represented by the TERPEL
10 ECOPETROL workers union historically has been one of the most influential and political strongest in the
country.
11 For details, see Ecopetrol’s press release of June 6 1997. According to such bulletin there was a tight compe-
tition between the winner (Gas Natural-Spain) and British Petroleum, Amoco, Empresas Publicas de Medellin
(EPM), and France Gas.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 13
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stations was the first privatization sale after the CONPES document 2648 of 1993 was approved.
TERPEL was traditionally the competitor of private retailers. Thus, this transfer implied that
gasoline retail distribution became a 100% privately-owned but regulated industry, in contrast to
other oil producers in Latin America such as Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela where gasoline
distribution is still an industry vertically integrated with the state oil company.
TABLE 3
ECOPETROL PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM BY JUNE 1999 - (USD AND UNITS)
Company/Name Share Number Sale Sale Priv. Selling
Activity Before Assess. Stocks Price Price Date Method
Priv Price Sold Solid. Private
% $USD $USD $USD
Gas Companies
Gas Natural Transp. 60.6 5.85 9,088,711 5.85 17.46 1997 Pref-Offer
Distrib. Stock Market
Colgas Distrib. 16.2 0.08 12,267,411 0.08 On Going Pref-Offer
Sale Stock Market
Promigas Transp. 28.8 2.46 16,954,441 2.46 2.95 1997 Pref-Offer
Stock Market
Invercolsa Distrib. 24.8 0.06 0.06 On going Pref-Offer
Sale Stock Market
Surtigas Distrib. 15.4 0.22 No sale
Gases Guajira Transp. 6.2 n.a No Sale
Distrib.
Gasoline Companies
Terpel Sabana Distrib. 40.0 640,000 8.34 1993 Direct Offer
Terpel Bucaramanga S.A. Distrib. 36.1 1,882,322 9.78 1993 Stock Market
Terpel del Centro S.A. Distrib. 49.7 46,993,690 0.28 1993 Stock Market
Terpel Sur S.A. Distrib. 45.6 262,290 8.27 1993 Stock Market
Terpel Norte S.A. Distrib. 18.0 2,290,105 0.90 1993 Stock Market
Notes: After 1995 all privatizations were subject to Law 226; Ecopetrol stopped the sale of Iversolsa in 2000.
Colgas has not been sold by 2001
Sources: Ecopetrol- Planning Office Requested Files; Decree 829/1999; DNP (1993, 1997)
3.3 PRIVATIZATION IN THE POWER SECTOR
The regulatory reform in Colombia’s electricity supply industry (ESI) is supported by the
Electric Law (Law 143) and by the Domiciliary Public Services Law (Law 142) of July 1994. The 1994
reform has been the most important and comprehensive since 1967 because it changed the
structure of a vertically integrated industry. The new regulatory institutions in turn started to
operate one year later The core elements of the reform followed the schemes adopted in the14 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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Great Britain concerning the separation of power activities and markets, the setting up of an
electricity spot market, and the development of long-term contract market for electricity.12
Privatization arose therefore as one instrument for promoting market competition and in-
dustry restructuring. Thus, it became a complementary policy within a broad deregulatory con-
text. Table 4 describes the selling process, which had two phases until 1998. The first one was the
1996-1997 privatization round focused in the selling of thermal plants and hydroelectric stations.
The sales went up to USD 3,900 millions. This represented a 50% transfer of overall system
generating capacity. The most important transaction was the sale of 48% of Bogotá Power
Company’s net worth, which included also the transfer of the local distribution network and the
regional grid. The buyers were two holdings leaded by ENDESA and CHILECTRA, which are
Chile’s largest power generators. The second phase of the privatization program took place in
1998 and focused in the capitalization and sale of the CORELCA holding, which covers Colombia’s
Atlantic Northern region.
The restructuring implied the holding division in several independent companies according
to power activity: generation, transmission and distribution. The national grid company ISA
bought 65% of the new transmission company equity share. On the other hand, a holding
formed by American and Venezuelan utilities purchased 65% equity share of the two distribu-
tion utilities founded after CORELCA’s restructuring. Both transactions added up USD 1,160
millions.13
 12 The national grid company Interconexión Eléctrica S.A (ISA), was founded in 1967. By that time, the sectoral
developed view was to consolidate ISA as the largest nationwide power generator and transporter of bulk
electricity following the vertically integrated natural monopoly model. For more details, see The World
Bank (1991). A complete description of the regulatory reform in Colombia’s power sector is in Pombo
(2001b) and ISA reports. Historically, Colombia’s power sector is divided in five regional markets: Bogotá
Power Company (EEB); The Atlantic Coast Regional Electric Corporation (CORELCA), Public Enter-
prises of Medellin (EPM), Public Enterprises of Cali and the Cauca Valley Corporation (EMCALI and
CVC), and the Power Colombian Institute (ICEL). So far, only two out of five power distribution networks
has been already privatized. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that the city of Bogotá stills as the
largest shareholder of CODENSA; the power distribution utility founded after EEB divestiture. There-
fore, EPM, EMCALI, and ICEL still, as public utilities, covering 70% of the geographical areas that belong
to the National Interconnected System. Hence, privatization and entry competition still a pending and
unfinished task for local power distribution.
13 A complete description of the regulatory reform in Colombia’s power sector is in Pombo (2001b) and ISA
reports. Historically, Colombia’s power sector is divided in five regional markets: Bogotá Power Company
(EEB), CORELCA, Public Enterprises of Medellin (EPM), Public Enterprises of Cali and the Cauca Valley
Corporation (EMCALI and CVC), and the Power Colombian Institute (ICEL). So far, only two out of five
power distribution networks has been already privatized. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that the city
of Bogotá stills as the largest shareholder of CODENSA; the power distribution utility founded after EEB
divestiture. Therefore, EPM, EMCALI, and ICEL still, as public utilities, covering 70% of the geographical
areas that belong to the National Interconnected System. Thus, privatization and entry competition still a
pending and unfinished task for local power distribution.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 15
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TABLE 4
PRIVATIZATION IN THE POWER SECTOR
Utility/Plant/ Transaction Seller Buyer Networth Investor
Hydroelectric Capacity Type USD Mill. Share Origin
MW %
Betania 500 Hydro 497 ICEL ENDESA 100 Chile
Chivor 1,000 Hydro 645 ISA CHILGENER 100 Chile
Tasajero 150 Thermal-Coal 30 ICEL Cooperative - Sector 58 Colombia
TermoCartagena 180 Thermal-Coal 15 Corelca Electricidad-Caracas 15 Venezuela
Cooperative - Sector 85 Colombia
EPSA-Gen 772 Hydro 535 CVC Houston  Industries/ 56 United States
210 Thermal-Gas
EPSA-Distrib Electricidad-Caracas Venezuela
EEB-Gen 2,312 Hydro 810 EEB Capital-Energia Holding
1 48.5 Chile-Spain
104 Thermal-Coal (EMGESA)
EEB-Distrib 1,085 EEB Luz-Bogota Holding
2 48.5 Chile-Spain
(CODENSA)
EEB-Trans. 141 EEB Capital-Energia Holding
1 5.5 Chile-Spain




ElectroCosta-Distrib CORELCA Houston Inc - Electricidad 65 USA-Ven
and Caracas
ElectroCaribe-Distrib 980 CORELCA Houston Inc - Electricidad 65 USA-Ven
Caracas
Transelca-Transm 180.5 CORELCA ISA 65 Colombia




Notes: EEB = Empresa de Energía de Bogota; EPSA = Empresa del Pacifico S.A (former CVC); CVC =
Corporación Autónoma del Cauca; ICEL = Instituto Colombiano de Energía Eléctrica; CORELCA = Corporación
Eléctrica de la Costa Atlántica; ISA = Interconexión Eléctrica S.A.
1/: Capital Energía = ENDESA (Chile) + ENDESA-Desarrollo (Spain)
2/: Luz Bogota = CHILECTRA (Chile) + ENERSIS (Chile) + ENDESA-Desarrollo (Spain)
Sources: MME (1996) and (1998) Reports to the Congress; ISA reports (1998, 1999), DNP (2001).
The coming section will focus on the performance analysis for the privatized firms in manu-
facturing and power utilities in order to provide an assessment for privatization and economic
deregulation policies in these two sectors where their assets transfers counts for 90% of the total
privatization sales in the real sector until mid 1999.
IV. THE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The present section studies firm performance within a sample of former IFI manufacturing
enterprises and the thermal power plants that were subject to privatization, restructured or were
new entrants because of the new regulation. The approach follows the general framework of
Meggisson et. al. (1994) and Lopez de Silanes (1999) et. al., but it departs from them in the specific
methodology regarding the measurement of the performance variables by firm. This study relies16 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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on the measurements of efficiency, market power, technology, and profitability indicators follow-
ing standard methodologies in industrial economics based on a combination of physical and finan-
cial series extracted from datasets that follow a statistical protocol. For instance, technical efficiency
proxies rely on non-parametric measurements derived from growth accounting decomposition or
best practice frontiers using physical input and output series. These methodologies are technically
better than financial ratios indicators derived from accounting data.
Grouping financial statements data across firms might have several biases because statements
are influenced by the current tax, depreciation and subsidies regimes. The problem gets worse if
data come from highly inflationary economies where adjustments for inflation are a common
accounting practice. For example, if one takes the asset book value as proxy of capital stock it
will overstate any measurement of capital productivity. The value of fixed assets is already af-
fected by the accounting depreciation rate, which by far exceeds any economic depreciation rate.
For that reason in industrial economics it is common to assume lower depreciation rates reflect-
ing the real replacement consumption of capital equipment and their technical useful life bench-
mark. Similar problems are found for the other indicators. Hence, one must keep some caveats
on the results based on solely financial data.
4.1 STYLED FACTS AND CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE IN MANUFACTURING
The study of privatized firms in manufacturing consists of 30 former IFI enterprises that
have records at DANE’s Annual Manufacturing Survey [Encuesta Anual Manufacturera (EAM)].
These enterprises were at some point either publicly owned or mixed capital companies, where
IFI was a founder partner. Nineteen of such firms started commercial operations between the
fifties and mid seventies. This means that incumbent plants are the dominating ones within the
sample. For instance, the sample has the larger steel mills, tires and tubes, pulp and paper, and the
basic industrial chemicals plants. On the other hand, twenty-one firms were part of the 1986-
1997 IFI’s transfer program, accounting for 75% of total accumulated privatization sales. Four
of them are exiting firms that were liquidated after 1992. The reminding firms are cases in which
companies were either transferred to the private sector before 1987 or the sale was postponed
for strategic reasons.14 The dataset is an unbalanced panel that records individual information
since 1974 to 1998. Hence, the panel allows an analysis by market dynamics tracking down data
by firm according to entry and exit flows. That feature makes the study sample appealing be-
cause of the robustness and length of the dataset in contrast to the datasets used in other studies
on privatization, which at most have available time series with three or four observations before
and after privatization [Meggison & Netter (2001)].15
Table 5 presents a summary of the basic variables for the IFI sample and their weight into
total manufacturing before and after the privatization. Without any doubt the sample constitutes
14 Appendix 2 lists the sample firms. We could access to the EAM dataset at plant level thanks to the technical
cooperation agreement between the University and DANE [Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística]. All
the information was processed within DANE’s headquarters.
15 The Meggison & Netter (2001) paper is a comprehensive review on privatization studies. The paper provides
a summary of the sample, study period and methodology of each reviewed case study. See Appendix 3 for a
brief description of the EAM dataset.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 17
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a representative selection of firms within Colombia’s manufacturing. For instance, they account
for 5% of industry’s value added, 3% of industry’s employment, and most importantly, they
represent 20% of the total capital stock as well as power consumption of total manufacturing.
They are larger capital-intensive plants.
TABLE 5
IFI-SAMPLE AND TOTAL MANUFACTURING
Summary of the Basic Variables Pre and Post privatization periods
Averages (USD at 1995 prices and Units)
Variable Pre-Privatization Post Privatization
        1974-1989         1990-1998
IFI-sample IND IFI-Sample IND (1)/(2) (3)/(4)
Gross Output (Mill) 1,203 20,145 1,751 31,052 6.0 5.6
Value Added (Mill) 497 9,030 697 13,495 5.5 5.2
Total Employment 20,631 495,404 15,806 622,594 4.2 2.5
Gross Investment (Mill) 127 956 92 1,372 13.2 6.7
Capital Stock (Mill) 2,016 9,679 2,934 14,450 20.8 20.3
Number of Plants 25 6,356 27 7,475
Monthly Per-capita Compensation 904 451 1,134 506
Consumption of Electricity (GWh per year) 1,060 4,953 1,594 8,299 21.4 19.2
Source: Own estimations based on EAM-DANE
The study of the IFI sample seeks to analyze changes in economic performance before and
after privatization. Without loss of generality the post-privatization period in Colombia matches
with the economic openness policy of the nineties. In fact, thirty out of thirty-seven IFI
privatization contracts took place after March 1990. The analysis relies on the measurement of
six broad indicators of performance and strategic competition: i) efficiency and productivity, ii)
profitability, iii) scale economies, iv) industry concentration, v) assets and investment, iv) em-
ployment and wages, and vi) total output.
The proxies are measured first at firm level and then they are weighted grouped by economic
usage classification —durable and non-durable consumer, intermediate and capital goods— with the
purpose of presenting general trends for the pre-privatization and post-privatization periods. Most
proxies are relative ratios to ISIC-specific or to total manufacturing. Therefore, the indicators are
already industry-adjusted or controlled by groups. For incumbent firms the pre-privatization period is 1974-
1989. For entrants, the time series start with the first recorded observation, which in most cases
coincides with the startup year of commercial operations. The sample has four exiting firms, which
shut down operations within the privatization period [1990-1998]. The length of the dataset allows
assuming that in most cases firms have had enough time to complete restructuring a processes after18 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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privatization. One fact needs a further comment. The dataset is clean for measuring errors. This bias
comes from samples where there are few observations before privatization. It is a well-known fact
that financial records might be tampered with in order to make the selling effective and by this way
understate or overstate the gains of privatization. Other source of that bias is the case when SOEs
are capitalized before privatization with the purpose of speeding up the selling.16 Hence, outliers are
easily detected and controlled with other variable trends within a time series context.17
The analysis continues as follows. First, general trends are displayed for each type of indicators.
Second, testing the null of no changes in proxy’s mean and median before and after privatization
evaluates changes in performance for the sample of privatized firms. One starting question is what
happened with productive efficiency [Table 6]. Total factor productivity growth for the IFI sample
follows closely the cycle for total manufacturing [Figure 1]. The slowdown of the nineteen eighties
is more drastic for the IFI sample, which shows on average a negative growth in TFP [-1.04%].
The drastic drop in capital productivity where investment rates were not compensated with a
sustained growth in domestic demand explains the productivity cycle. This was particularly se-
vere within the intermediate goods plants. Labor productivity in turn increased more than pro-
portionally for the IFI firms in contrasts to total manufacturing, partially offsetting the fall in
capital productivity. On average, the index of labor productivity rose 58% in its level after 1990.
This implies that plant restructuring took place after privatization. Moreover, the sample’s labor
productivity relative to total manufacturing rose from 1.6 times before privatization to 2.2 times
on average during the nineties [Figure 2]. In sum, the above elements are beneath the modest
recovery in TFP for IFI firms [1.38%] as well as in total manufacturing [1.26%].
Is there anything to say about the direction of plant restructuring? IFI plants are on average
4.7 times more capital-intensive than total manufacturing. For the privatization period this num-
ber increased to 8.4 times [Table 7]. Hence, IFI plants invested more or experienced sharper
adjustment of their payrolls. It seems that both things happened simultaneously. Except for
producers of durable consumer goods all other firms in the sample kept the pace in their invest-
ments in machinery and equipment. Plant size got reduced moving on average from 11.6 times
before privatization to 7.4 times after it. Thus, firms followed a strategy toward reducing their
excess capacity and, rationalize capital spending.
Output scale increased significantly within producers of capital goods. Their scale of operations
got 38 times larger than the average within the capital goods industry during the nineties. Producers
of consumer goods doubled their scale relative to their competitors, and basic materials kept
constant. These results suggest that part of productivity gains were due to size effects rather than a
pure cost diminishing technical change. Regarding labor input the layoffs bore more on workers
than technicians and administrative employees. Moreover, the cut was located within the producers
of basic materials. In other cases, there were normal adjustments or even increases in payroll.18
16 According to Laporta and López-de-Silanes (1999) paper this happened in Mexico when government tried to
initiate several restructuring processes.
17 Appendix 2 summarizes the methodology in the construction of the basic variables, the performance indica-
tors and sources.
18 This fact was also noticed in Megginson’s 1994 cross-country study.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 19
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 TABLE 6
EFFICIENCY AND INVESTMENT RELATED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
IFI SAMPLE AND TOTAL MANUFACTURING
Pre-Priv Post-Priv Pre-Priv Post-Priv
Indicator/Industry 74-89 90-98 Indicator/Industry 74-89 90-98
EFFICIENCY
I. Total Factor Productivity Growth (%) IV. Investment Rate (%)
IFI-SAMPLE IFI-SAMPLE
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods -3.25% 4.59%    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 21.52% 16.64%
   Durable Consumer Goods -1.33% 1.15%    Durable Consumer Goods 5.61% 5.03%
   Intermediate Goods -0.52% 0.83%    Intermediate Goods 23.43% 14.38%
   Capital Goods 0.48% 0.54%    Capital Goods 11.85% 6.27%
   Total-IFI -1.04% 1.38%    Total-IFI 21.02% 12.67%
Total Manufacturing /1 0.12% 1.26% Total Manufacturing 10.66% 10.36%
II. Partial Capital Productivity (1974=100) V. Value Added Growth (%)
IFI-SAMPLE IFI-SAMPLE
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods 29.6 14.6    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 9.72% 8.78%
   Durable Consumer Goods 74.6 27.8    Durable Consumer Goods -0.10% 9.06%
   Intermediate Goods 47.7 20.0    Intermediate Goods 5.34% -4.42%
   Capital Goods 69.4 83.2    Capital Goods 2.64% 1.39%
   Total-IFI 46.2 21.9    Total-IFI 4.90% -2.62%
Total Manufacturing 96.3 95.6 Total Manufacturing 3.82% 3.04%
III. Partial Labor Productivity (1974=100)
IFI-SAMPLE
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods 69.0 103.9
   Durable Consumer Goods 99.1 167.0
   Intermediate Goods 143.6 231.6
   Capital Goods 88.8 142.5
   Total-IFI 127.1 200.9
Total Manufacturing 115.7 138.3
Methodology: TFPg = Changes in Translog Indices of TFP for IFI sample and Manufacturing and corrected for
changes in inputs’ efficiency. Aggregate Inputs follow a Translog specification.
Notes: 1/ refers to 1990-1995.
Source: Own measurements based on EAM-DANE.20 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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FIGURE 1
TRANSLOG INDICES OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY





































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimation based on DANE-EAM
FIGURE 2
PARTIAL PRODUCTIVITY LABOR INDICES AND RELATIVE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
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 TABLE 7
IFI SAMPLE AND TOTAL MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYMENT AND PLANT’S TECHNOLOGY RELATED VARIABLES
Pre-Priv Post-Priv Pre-Priv Post-Priv
Indicator/Industry 74-89 90-98 Indicator/Industry 74-89 90-98
I. Employment by Occupational Category V. Relative Output Scale
IFI-SAMPLE IFI-SAMPLE
   Workers 14,678 10,944    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 1.66 3.82
   Administrative Employees 4,640 3,890    Durable Consumer Goods 2.19 3.94
   Technicians 1,312 972    Intermediate Goods 11.73 11.38
   Capital Goods 26.26 38.23
II Total Employment by Type of Industry     Total-IFI 13.18 14.64
IFI-SAMPLE VI. Relative Capital-Labor ratios
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods 1,242 1,798
   Durable Consumer Goods 311 372 IFI-SAMPLE
   Intermediate Goods 16,415 11,103    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 1.41 1.69
   Capital Goods 2,663 2,533    Durable Consumer Goods 0.43 1.70
   Total-IFI 20,631 15,806    Intermediate Goods 4.14 7.71
   Capital Goods 1.03 1.38
Total Manufacturing 495,404 622,515    Total-IFI 4.70 8.36
III. Relative Compensation by Ocupational Category VII Embodied Investment Rate (%)
IFI-SAMPLE IFI-SAMPLE
   Workers 1.87 2.50    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 62.0% 76.5%
   Employees 1/ 1.85 2.32    Durable Consumer Goods 87.5% 30.1%
   Intermediate Goods 71.8% 84.7%
IV. Relative Plant Size    Capital Goods 70.4% 65.7%
   Total-IFI 69.6% 80.4%
IFI-SAMPLE
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods 5.57 4.95 Total Manufacturing 68.2% 71.2%
   Durable Consumer Goods 5.26 2.73
   Intermediate Goods 11.37 7.29
   Capital Goods 7.87 8.78
   Total-IFI 11.52 7.26
Source: Own estimations based on DANE-EAM
Notes: 1/ Include technicians; relative indicators are ratios between the proxy for the IFI sample with respect to
economic usage classification group or total manufacturing proxy.
Employment cuts were too small relative to other international experiences. The Mexican
privatization payrolls in manufacturing were halved according to Lopez de Silanes (1999), while the
privatization of British Telecom implied more than 5,000 layoffs, the same number than the IFI
sample. Finally, the relative compensation —wages and social benefits— increased in 33% for
workers and 25% for employees after privatization, which is explained by the sharp increase in
labor productivity. Profitability shows a decreasing trend for IFI firms as well as total manufactur-
ing [Figure 3]. Excepting the producers of durable consumer goods, IFI plants have been profit-22 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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able enterprises before and after privatization according to their Lerner index. On average, the
profit rate was 9% above the market real deposit rate before privatization. Afterwards it has been
6% covering their opportunity cost [Table 8]. Contrasting with the markup coefficient for total
manufacturing and type of industry according to economic usage classification, one sees that IFI
firms were more profitable than their competitors during the nineties except again, for the case of
durable consumer goods. Such pattern contrasts with the findings in other studies. For instance,
Mexican SOEs were highly unprofitable [-30%] before privatization [López de Silanes (1999)].
FIGURE 3

















Source: Banco de la República and own estimations based on DANE-EAM
Besides the falling trend there is a convergence in the markup rates during the nineties across
industry groups as Table 8 suggests. This behavior is partly explained by the tariff reduction that
came with the economic openness program. For instance, intermediate goods industries were
highly protected until the mid-eighties having a positive correlation with their markup level.
Thus, the firm’s market power has diminished because deregulation made entry a credible threat,
while exposure to foreign competition disciplined domestic markets.
The gross margin rate is a proxy for plant working capital. Except for capital goods, IFI firms
are more constrained due to a payroll structure that makes per-capita wages greater than their
competitors. One reason for such inflexibility is the existence of labor union convention clauses.
Most former IFI firms, traditionally, have had well-functioning labor unions. After privatization,
IFI firms close the gap in this indicator showing that they were able to partially ease such con-
straint through the renegotiation of wage targeting clauses.19
19 The 1990 labor market reform [Law 50] eliminated   wage rigidities such as the retroactive severance system,
and the mandatory reinstatement regime for workers with more than 10 years in payroll. For details of the
reforms of the nineties see Montenegro (1995).CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 23
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The changes in performance within IFI firms are tested by means of the Mann-Whitney
(1947) rank-sum test. The idea from the statistical point of view is to consider privatization
applied to matched (unmatched) samples as an experiment and test the null if the treatment was
effective.
TABLE 8
IFI SAMPLE AND TOTAL MANUFACTURING - PROFITABILITY AND MARKET POWER
Pre-Priv Post-Priv Pre-Priv Post-Priv
Indicator/Industry 74-89 90-98 Indicator/Industry 74-89 90-98
I. Market Share (%) III. Relative Gross Margin Rate
IFI-SAMPLE 5.9% 5.7% IFI-SAMPLE 0.85 0.95
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods 0.5% 1.0%    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 0.66 0.86
   Durable Consumer Goods 0.2% 0.3%    Durable Consumer Goods 0.78 0.81
   Intermediate Goods 10.6% 8.7%    Intermediate Goods 0.84 0.94
   Capital Goods 12.0% 15.4%    Capital Goods 1.24 1.14
II. Lerner Index (%) 1/   IV. Herfindal Concentration Indices 
IFI-SAMPLE 15.0% 11.9% TOTAL MANUFACTURING 0.0835 0.0624
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods 24.1% 13.9%    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 0.0927 0.0763
   Durable Consumer Goods 3.1% 1.4%    Durable Consumer Goods 0.0539 0.0510
   Intermediate Goods 15.3% 12.9%    Intermediate Goods 0.1149 0.0833
   Capital Goods 19.1% 17.2%    Capital Goods 0.0401 0.0226
V. Rel. per-capita compensation total employment 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING /2 13.5% 9.5%
   Non-Durable Consumer Goods 10.3% 8.5% IFI-SAMPLE 1.88 2.37
   Durable Consumer Goods 6.0% 5.7%    Non-Durable Consumer Goods 0.93 1.04
   Intermediate Goods 21.2% 14.2%    Durable Consumer Goods 1.29 1.65
   Capital Goods 7.2% 4.1%    Intermediate Goods 1.73 2.22
   Capital Goods 1.72 2.80
VI. Real Deposit Rate 6.8% 6.3%
Sources: Own estimations based on DANE-EAM; Demand Price elasticities by ISIC Group from Pombo (1999);
Deposit rates: 1970-1979 [Faimboin (1991)]; 1980-1998: Banco República
Notes: 1/: IFI Lerner Indices based on Domestic Supply [Y + M] by ISIC group specific
2/: Markup Indices = Herfindal / Demand price elasticity; refers to average for the 1990-1995 period
This test is non-parametric because data is ordered or counts for events that belong to individu-
als from different groups.20 The test relies on changes in medians rather than means because there
is no need for assuming symmetry. If medians differ, then rejecting the null indicates that popula-
tion medians come from different distributions. Hence, the experiment is effective if the observed
change is statistically robust and matches with the expected one. The number of usable observa-
tions (N), in this case matches up with the dimension of sample size, that is, the number of firms
20 See Sprent & Smeeton (2001) for further explanation on tests for two independent samples.24 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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times number of observed years before and after the privatization periods. Thus, the experiment is
repeated m times before privatization and k times after it for each individual.21
The interpretation of the results is not straightforward because one has to analyze two forces
behind the tests. On one side, testing differences in sample means and assuming equal variances
shows the direction of privatization effects. On the other side, by testing for differences in medians
one is evaluating a change in the distribution shape, which may or may not coincide with the
direction of the change in means. For instance, increases in the sample mean with a negative change
in the median show that overalls variation might be explained for few individuals in the sample.
Thus, privatization effects are not equally distributed or might have opposite results across firms.
Taking into account the above caveats, Table 9 summarizes the basic results applied to IFI
sample. The outcome reinforces the stylized facts up to a certain point. Nine out of twenty-one
variables showed the expected relationship in the mean change during the privatization period.
Nevertheless, only seven of them are statistically significant. The tests on profitability variables
show that IFI firms increased their gross margin rate relative to their competitors but overall markups
decreased as in all over manufacturing. However, IFI firms still are more profitable despite the
closing gap: the mean (median) is 1.93 (1.39) times relative to ISIC group during the nineties.
The tests on efficiency variables indicate that the relative TFP indices increased the mean 20%
while medians fell in 2 %. On average, IFI firms increased 21% the mean of TFP translog indices
after privatization. On the other hand, taking the differences with respect to ISIC specific in
TFP growth rates show an opposite variation. IFI’s TFP growth was 3% above ISIC average
during the 1974-1989 period. In the nineties, it dropped to -0.1%, which indicates a productivity
convergence within industry groups. Thus, lower markups with increases in productivity suggest
that IFI firms followed pro-competitive strategies after privatization. This also implies the lower
industry concentration indices tested by means of changes in market share. Another feature is
that investment did not jump after privatization. In fact, the relative investment rates fell from
2.5 to 2.0 times the rate observed in ISIC averages.22
Regarding output, IFI firms were able to generate new economies of scale since the mean of
output scale increased in 1.5 times relative to ISIC average between periods. The relative com-
pensation rates showed the opposite change with the expected one. The mean (median) rose
0.35 (0.17) points relative to ISIC average during the privatization period. Finally, the tests for
changes in performance on the other variables were not conclusive.
In sum, the stylized facts as well as the tests on the industry-adjusted changes in performance
indicate that IFI firms followed pro-cyclical trends relative to overall behavior in manufacturing.
Thus, there was no asymmetric performance of these companies in contrast to their private
peers. Part of the explanation for this is that IFI firms were mixed-capital enterprises and fol-
lowed profit maximizing pricing rules rather than pursuing second best prices or net transfers
through subsidized sale prices. As a result, management strategies followed private sector bench-
21 The size of m depends of firm’s entry date as well as k for the exit one. Taking averages before and after
privatization such as Megginson (1994), reduces running the experiment only once.
22 This finding is similar to the case of Mexico [Lopez de Silanes (1999)].CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 25
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marks although tariff policy favored at some point and for some cases, their dominant position
within domestic markets. The supporter role of IFI made it a non-principal shareholder but a
strategic one for firm capitalization. Accordingly, the Institute never had the intention of setting
company’s management policies.
TABLE 9
IFI-FIRMS: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE
SAMPLE OF PRIVATIZED FIRMS - MANN-WHITNEY RANK SUM AND T-TESTS
Variable N N Mean Mean Median Median Mean Median t-stat Z-stat % of Firms Expected
74-89 90-98 74-89 90-98 74-89 90-98 Change Change change change Improved Relationship
Mean  Median Performance
Profitability
Relative Gross Margin  394 227 0.1903 1.2814 1.0222 0.9206 1.0911 -0.1016 -1.233 ** 3.624 * 46 Increase
Lerner Index (Domestic Supply) 394 227 0.1482 0.1275 0.0663 0.1015 -0.0207 0.0351 1.588 * 1.070 28 Increase
Relative Lerner Index  394 227 2.1805 1.9358 1.4161 1.3984 -0.2448 -0.0178 1.352 ** 0.200 54 Increase
Efficiency
Relative Partial Labor Productivity 394 227 1.32 1.38 1.07 1.02 0.0641 -0.0469 -0.759 0.983 42 Increase
Relative Partial Capital Productivity 393 227 8.68 7.20 1.73 0.99 -1.4841 -0.7469 0.854 2.722 * 42 Increase
Translog Index of TFP (I1974 = 100) 448 231 116.58 140.39 98.49 81.89 23.81 -16.61 -2.777 * 3.089 * 42 Increase
Relative Translog Index of TFP  391 158 1.4082 1.6089 1.0431 1.0263 0.2006 -0.0169 -1.656 * -0.212 46 Increase
Adjusted TFP Growth 366 158 0.0308 -0.0098 0.0105 -0.0173 -0.0406 -0.0278 1.656 * 1.664 ** 36 Increase
Industry Concentration
Market Share 394 227 0.1354 0.1082 0.0735 0.0793 -0.0272 0.0058 2.502 * 1.323 32 Decrease
Relative Market Share 394 227 0.1969 0.1501 0.0519 0.0633 -0.0468 0.0114 2.353 * 0.822 36 Decrease
Scale Economies
Plant Size 394 227 5.58 6.27 3.64 2.96 0.6810 -0.6822 -0.932 0.590 53 Decrease
Plant Scale 394 227 6.31 7.85 3.38 2.67 1.5324 -0.7033 -1.815 * -0.463 46 Increase
Relative Capital-Labor Ratio  393 227 4.91 4.15 0.6744 0.9659 -0.7618 0.7699 0.770 -2.119 * 50 Increase
Assets and Investment
Gross Investment Rate - I/VA 394 227 0.8470 0.1753 0.0608 0.0516 -0.6717 -0.0092 1.012 2.409 * 21 Increase
Relative Gross Investment Rate 396 230 2.5585 2.0300 0.6322 0.3659 -0.5285 -0.2663 0.440 3.066 * 43 Increase
Relative Embodied Investment Rate 389 223 1.6134 1.1934 1.0176 0.9737 -0.4200 -0.0439 0.887 1.544 50 Increase
Labor
Log workers 389 224 5.62 5.50 5.87 5.63 -0.1253 -0.2445 1.027 1.576 42 Decrease
Log Administrative Employees 394 222 4.53 4.56 4.71 4.54 0.0342 -0.1732 -0.341 0.331 64 Decrease
Log Technicians 354 221 3.04 2.89 3.00 2.75 -0.1536 -0.2430 1.338 ** 1.122 46 Increase
Wages
Relative compensation rate total emplo 394 227 1.07 1.41 1.07 1.24 0.3489 0.1698 -7.440 * -5.660 85 Decrease
Output
 Log Real Gross Output (1995 USD) 394 227 16.69 17.07 16.89 17.48 0.3767 0.5897 -2.607 * -2.741 71 Increase
Methodology: Ranksum test of changes in proxy’s medians = proxy t-k and t+k; with t = 1990 for every i and k
= number of observed records before and after privatization. Meggison’s (1994) methodology = proxy average t-
k, and t+ k with k = 3 years of every privatized firm i. T-test H0: mean (0) - mean (1) = 0
Notes: *: Significant at size of 0.05; **: Significant at size of 0.1
Maximum sample size = n x t; where n = number of firms and t = number of recorded years, that is Pre-
privatization period: 1974-1989 = 28 x 16 = 480 and Post-privatization: 1990-1998: 28 x 9 = 270.
The dataset excludes two firms that did no have recorded data before 1991.26 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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4.2 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS IN THE POWER SECTOR
The ex-post performance analysis in the power sector must take into account the effects of
the 1994 reform on firm entry, market competition, and efficiency gains. In that sense, the
analysis focuses on the pattern of key variables that are aggregated at sectoral level, and then it
concentrates in direct measures of profitability by the privatized larger power utilities and pro-
ductive efficiency for thermal generation. The reform has induced, without loss of generality,
the following results: i) new investment in thermal generating capacity, ii) privatization and the
new regulation led to a balanced competition between public and private generators, iii) a de-
crease in electricity wholesale prices, and iv) a new composition of electricity demand toward
non-regulated users.
Regarding investment in new capacity, the new regulation has used two instruments to
incentive market entry. One is the designing of capacity charges by which the regulator guaran-
tees a minimum return on the installed capacity. The second instrument is the power purchase
agreements (PPAs). These are long term contracts through which generators hedge against unex-
pected changes in demand and distributors from system’s constraints. One type of PPA initially
implemented in Colombia is to pay what is generated, which implies an advance purchase of plant
capacity. Most of thermal generators are marginal producers whose objective is to generate at
system’s hedge. In fact, the thermal park had 63 plants with an effective capacity of 3,800 MW in
1998, which represent a 32% share. Among them 21 started commercial operations after 1993
and 16 are privately owned. This is not a coincidence since the government had already under-
taken an emergency expansion plan to overcome the 1992 power crisis.23
Figure 4 displays the evolution of thermal capacity and generation during the nineties, and it
clearly shows the sharp increase in the thermal capacity, which doubled in seven years. A second
fact is that the ratio of power generation to available capacity ratio shows an improvement after
the reform. Clearly, the 1992-1993 and 1997 periods match with the bad hydrology and the el niño
cycle but there is a difference between them. In 1992 there was a rationing of about 16% of the
power demand and by June 1993, when the power rationing was over, power generation to
available capacity ratio was over 0,8, reflecting the insufficiency of the thermal park in backing
the system. In contrast, such ratio was 0,35 when the second el niño ended by June 1998. In sum,
fixed investment in thermal generation has played a central role in improving system reliability as
well as promoting market entry in power generation.
The second point concerns ownership composition. The reform has induced to a balanced
distribution of the power generating capacity between public and private utilities. Public utilities
count for 42% of total capacity while private and mixed capital utilities hold a 58% share. The
largest generator has 21% of market share [Table 10].24 This outcome contrasts with the initial
23 An analysis of the 1992 blackout is in Pombo (2001b) op cit. The official version of the blackout causes and
policy measures is in the 1993 Ministry of Mining report to the Congress.
24 The National Interconnected System was formed by 33 hydro centrals plus 63 thermal plants distributed
among 26 power companies in 1998. EMGESA the largest generator was founded after the Bogotá Power
Company Divestiture. On the other hand, no single power generator can have more than ¼ of system’s
generating capacity (Law 143).CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 27
Abril de 2002
divestiture in the UK where the CEGB was broken into a duopoly for non-nuclear generation,
and in Chile where the three larger power generators control 85% of the market.
FIGURE 4


































































Notes: ACAP: Available Capacity; ECAP: Effective Capacity
 Regarding prices and commercial electricity demand, Table 11 summarizes the main variables
of the electricity market. Two facts are noticeable. First, the evolution of electricity spot prices
suggests that buyers —power distributors— have effectively hedged against Pool price volatility
[Figure 5]. Contract real prices have dropped 42% from 1996 to 2000. Such outcome is impor-
tant since contracts have a 75% market share of bulk electricity. Other important outcome is
that market deregulation has sharply increased the number of non-regulated users, most of
which them are large industrial and commercial clients. In that direction the definition for large
customer has changed over time. It began with a minimum individual consumption of 2.5 MW/
month and has gradually decreased. The current level is at 0.1 MW/month implying that non-
regulated demand doubles during the analyzed period.
Concerning firm performance, two exercises are carried out. The first one concerns the
measurement of productive efficiency at plant-level for a sample of thermal plants. Fifty-five
plants that belong to the interconnected system have made up the thermal park since 1995.
Nonetheless, just 32 units were active, having a permanent or temporal production within a
specific year. Because of the changes in the statistical sources, the dataset was divided in two
samples since 1988. The first sample records on average 33 thermal plants from 1988-1994 that
is the pre-reform years. The second one records 32 thermal units for the post-reform years
(1995-2000).28 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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 TABLE 10
COLOMBIA EFFECTIVE POWER GENERATING CAPACITY
BY PLANT OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 1998
               Capacity
Power-Utility Ownership Hydro Thermal Total Share
Name MW MW MW %
EMGESA Mixed 2,274.8 220.0 2,494.8 20.7
EPM Public 1,708.0 300.0 2,008.0 16.6
ISAGEN Public 1,410.0 193.0 1,603.0 13.3
CHIVOR S.A.  Private 1,000.0 1,000.0 8.3
EPSA Mixed 772.0 210.0 982.0 8.1
TEBSA Private 877.0 877.0 7.3
CORELCA Public 626.0 626.0 5.2
CHB Private 540.0 540.0 4.5
Others 1/ 431.8 1,513.0 1,944.8 16.1
Total Private 1,614.0 1,851.0 3,465.0 28.7
Total Public 3,475.8 1,658.0 5,133.8 42.5
Total Mixed 3,046.8 430.0 3,476.8 28.8
Total 8,136.6 3,939.0 12,075.6 100.0
Notes: 1/ Includes 17 additional power plant generators: 6 private, 1 mixed, and 11 public utilities.
Source ISA (1998)Source: 1998 ISA Report
TABLE 11
MARKET EFFICIENCY VARIABLES - ANNUAL AVERAGES
(USD AT DEC 1998 PRICES, GWH, UNITS)
Date Mean Mean Spot PPAs Attended Non Non Non
Spot PPAs price price Demand Regulated Regulated Regulated Regulated
Price Price Index Index Demand Demand Demand Users
US$/KWh US$/KWh Dic98=100 Dic98=100 GWh GWh GWh Share Number
Dec-96 0.0086 0.0349 54.1 125.3 3,543.1 457.3 2,869.7 0.1374 18.0
Dec-97 0.0680 0.0323 425.6 115.8 3,650.9 452.3 2,963.3 0.1330 100.5
Dec-98 0.0283 0.0285 176.8 102.3 3,595.5 649.0 2,810.4 0.1876 692.0
Dec-99 0.0159 0.0220 99.4 78.9 3,466.1 686.3 2,662.8 0.2050 906.3
Dec-00 0.0215 0.0202 134.8 72.7 3,422.6 865.1 2,566.9 0.2522 2,471.0
Sources: MEM-ISA and ISA-Reports
Notes: Value series in USD deflated by USA CPICARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 29
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FIGURE 5



















































































































Notes: PPA: Purchase Power Agreement
The measurement of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) efficiency scores needs information of
inputs and output by thermal unit. Plant inputs are capital (or capacity in MW), labor (number of
employees), and fuel consumption (coal, gas, fuel oil, and diesel oil). All fuels need a common
measure unit, such as BTUs or T-Calories.25 Output by turn is given in millions of KWh (GWh).
Information for power generation, consumption by type of fuel and capacity at plant-level is
available by crossing the different datasets before and after 1994.
Labor input is not directly observable for most units. Two reasons explain that problem. One
is that before privatization thermal units were vertically integrated to power utilities, thus payroll
series were recorded following accounting criteria. Power companies kept labor records to fulfill
the needs of their financial statements. Second, there was no regulator requesting information
by power activity. Labor statistics after 1996 have improved sharply since the regulator Superintency
of  Domiciliary Public Services is in charge of the SIVICO database. Labor series by power-company
are broken by occupational categories, sectoral activities (i.e. generation, transmission, and distri-
bution), and by type of power generation. In addition, after privatization the sold plants became
new utilities. This allowed making direct inferences of labor input (number of employees) by
thermal substations. Fixed coefficients of labor to capacity were assumed based on the informa-
tion sent by power generators in order to complete labor series before 1995.26
25 The basic conversion factors are: 1 kWh = 3,412.1 BTUs; 1 GWh = 0.86 T-Calories; 1 MW of Capacity =
1000 KWh.
26 Appendix 4 describes the methodology and the contents of the power sector databases. The request of labor
series was done through the Colombian Power Generator Association (ACOLGEN). SIVICO stands for
Sistema de Vigilacia y Control.30 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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Table 12 displays the main results of the efficiency frontier measurement exercise. The
most important result is that the efficient units before the reform are no longer the most effi-
cient after the reform. This suggest that there was a downward shift in the efficiency frontier
implying an efficiency gain due to entry and new gas-based and combined cycle technologies. In
fact, TEBSA, the largest thermal generator in the country as well as the other newer plants built
since 1993 exhibit efficiency scores close to 1.
The profitability exercise focused on the privatized power utilities of the Bogotá Power Com-
pany, the former regional holdings of CORELCA and CVC. Privatization sales in the former
focused on the regional power distribution utilities, while the latter included the generators sta-
tions that supply electricity for the city of Cali. The control group is Empresas Publicas de Medellin,
historically has been the most efficient utility and is municipal owned enterprise.27 The dataset
comes several sources that have recorded the main accounts of utilities income and balance
statements.28 The holding structure before privatization was kept in order to chain the series
after divestitures. The results are summarized in Table 13. The most striking result is that all
profitability indicators either adjusted and non-adjusted fell after the regulatory reform. Six out
of eight are statistical significant according to the tests on structural change in indicator means
and medians.
What explains such trends? To provide a common answer is not possible just looking data
from the financial statements because one has to keep perspective of the market deregulation.
Three elements, at least, played a central role. One was that privatized utilities have dropped their
final tariffs after 1995. Moreover, they have converged to EPM’s final user tariffs. The relative
tariff dropped from 1.7 to 1.04 after the reform. On the spending side, there was a sharp in-
crease in the financial costs during the first half of the nineties. The four regional markets had
on average a 90% real increase relative to the average of the 80s. Bogotá Power Company faced
most part of the indebtedness burden because of the over-costs generated by the five-years
delay in the startup of the Guavio hydro.29 Last, the value of inter-firm bulk electricity real
purchases increased in 110% on average after the reform relative to the first half of the 90s. The
high spot prices during the 1997-1998 niño explain such increase in operative costs. Besides, the
regulatory commission forced power companies to undertake further internal capitalization in
order to strengthen their net worth and financial leverage. Hence, the above elements squeezed
utilities gross and net profits.
The next section turns attention to modeling efficiency and profitability as function of plant
characteristics, ownership structure, and regulatory policy variables for the former IFI firms and
the sample of thermal plants with the purpose to shed light on the determinants of those
performance variables.
27 An indicator for utility efficiency is the index of power losses. See Pombo (2001b) for details in the trend of
such indicator since 1970 by power holding.
28 See appendix 4 for details.




Before and After the Regulatory Reform
DMU Plant Plant Owner- Cap Score Score Score1 Score1 Relative Relative
Name Startup ship MW before after before after Effic. Effic.1
1 Barranca1 1982 Public 13 78.59% 59.32% 78.59% 79.39% decrease increase
2 Barranca2 1982 Public 13 72.03% 59.32% 74.48% 77.02% decrease increase
3 Barranca3 1972 Public 66 87.98% 64.04% 87.98% 82.11% decrease decrease
4 Barranca4 1983 Public 32 66.25% 61.18% 66.25% 81.10% decrease increase
5 Barranca5 1983 Public 21 70.23% 61.76% 70.23% 82.17% decrease increase
6 Bquilla1 1980 Public 58 92.11% . 91.39% . .
7 Bquilla3 1980 Private 66 100.00% 66.24% 100.00% 71.56% decrease decrease
8 Bquilla4 1980 Private 69 96.99% 74.39% 98.03% 100.00% decrease increase
9 Cartagena1 1980 Private 66 86.77% 64.28% 100.00% 74.47% decrease decrease
10 Cartagena2 1980 Private 54 79.32% 65.15% 74.37% 82.74% decrease increase
11 Cartagena3 1980 Private 67 87.12% 68.15% 86.03% 82.45% decrease decrease
12 Chinu4 1982 Public 14 42.42% . 70.97% . .
13 Cospique1 1960 Public 4 90.86% . 100.00% . .
14 Cospique2 1960 Public 4 72.77% . 100.00% . .
15 Cospique3 1967 Public 8 100.00% . 97.22% . .
16 Cospique4 1966 Public 9 100.00% . 77.91% . .
17 Cospique5 1965 Public 12 44.87% . 85.84% . .
18 flores1 1993 Private 152 98.81% 100.00% 98.81% 100.00% increase increase
19 Guajira1 1987 Public 160 100.00% 85.63% 100.00% 77.43% decrease decrease
20 Guajira2 1987 Public 160 100.00% 83.74% 100.00% 89.15% decrease decrease
21 Paipa 1 1963 Public 31 40.48% 49.77% 32.08% 88.59% increase increase
22 Paipa 2 1975 Public 74 73.07% 37.94% 47.55% 78.91% decrease increase
23 Paipa3 1978 Public 74 63.31% 41.54% 38.74% 77.35% decrease increase
24 Palenque 3-4 1972 Public 15 87.80% 45.86% 100.00% 80.11% decrease decrease
25 Palenque5 1985 Public 21 67.06% . 67.06% . .
26 Proeléctrica1 1993 Private 46 99.93% 96.95% 99.93% 88.57% decrease decrease
27 Proeléctrica2 1993 Private 46 100.00% 96.95% 100.00% 96.54% decrease decrease
28 Tasajero 1985 Private 163 100.00% 67.55% 100.00% 82.41% decrease decrease
29 Tibú1 1965 Public 6 16.69% . 31.57% . .
30 Tibú2 1965 Public 6 16.32% . 80.26% . .
31 Zipa2-3 1976 Mixed 104 49.04% 88.88% 42.13% 67.21% increase increase
32 ZIPA3 1976 Mixed 66 . 22.35% . 80.21% .
33 Zipa4 1981 Mixed 66 46.26% 18.79% 46.01% 67.97% decrease increase
34 Zipa5 1985 Mixed 66 26.92% 32.13% 30.42% 86.55% increase increase
35 Flores2 1996 Private 100 . 91.99% . 92.05% .
36 Flores3 1998 Private 152 . 100.00% . 100.00% .
37 Merilectrica  1998 Private 157 . 78.87% . 92.73% .
38 TebsaB1 1998 Private 768 . 100.00% . 91.41% .
39 Termocentro1  1997 Public 99 . 91.60% . 100.00% .
40 dorada1 1997 Public 52 . 25.54% . 80.10% .
41 Sierra1 1998 Public 150 . 14.42% . 85.64% .
42 Termovalle1 1998 Private 214 . 82.37% . 88.58% .
Total Decrease (plants) 19 10
Share Capacity 36.1% 24.3%
Sources: Own Estimations based on EMS 1.3 software written by Holger Scheel (2000)
Notes: Input1: Capacity in MW; Input2: Labor in Number of Employees; Input3: Fuels, standardized in T-Calories;
Periods: Before Privatization 1988-1994; After Privatization: 1995-2000; Input-Output variables are annual aver-
ages; Score Assumptions: CRTS, No weights, Input-Oriented; Score1 Assumptions: CRTS, No weights, Input-Ori-
ented, Capacity corrected by short run unavailability index = MW * [1-SRUI] or capacity utilization (after 1994).32 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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TABLE 13
COLOMBIA-POWER SECTOR
NON-ADJUSTED AND INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE
Sample of Privatized Power Utilities and Public Enterprises of Medellin
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum and T-tests
Variable N N Mean Mean Median Median Mean Median t-stat Z-stat Expected
83-94 95-99 83-94 95-99 83-94 95-99 Change Change Change change Relation-
Mean  Median ship
Profitability Indicators (Non-Adjusted)
Operating Income/Sales 48 20 0.3208 0.1891 0.3587 0.2262 -0.1317 -0.1325 3.0930 * 2.410 * Increase
Net Income/Sales 48 20 0.1382 0.0882 0.1992 0.0998 -0.0500 -0.0995 0.6926 0.794 Increase
Operating Income/PPE 48 20 0.0562 0.0288 0.0556 0.0397 -0.0273 -0.0159 3.0597 * 2.544 * Increase
Operating Income/ 48 20 0.0997 0.0463 0.0958 0.0463 -0.0534 -0.0495 3.1554 * 3.876 * Increase
Net-Worth
Profitability Indicators (Industry-Adjusted)
Opertaing Income/Sales 36 15 0.7122 0.4088 0.82639 0.61091 -0.3034 -0.2155 2.3078 * 1.757 **Increase
Net Income/Sales 36 15 0.1677 0.0504 0.19492 -0.0076 -0.1173 -0.2025 0.3405 0.537 Increase
Operating Income/PPE 36 15 0.7458 0.3206 0.69331 0.40368 -0.4252 -0.2896 2.0175 * 2.233 * Increase
Operating Income/ 36 15 0.7647 0.3152 0.75588 0.37294 -0.4495 -0.3829 1.9958 ** 1.736 **Increase
Net-Worth
Mean Tariff 26 6 1.7088 1.0469 1.42132 1.02959 -0.6619 -0.3917 2.0318 * 1.977 * decrease
Sources: FEN and SSPD
Notes: * = significant at size of 0.05; ** = significant at size of 0.1
PPE = Fixed Assets Value corrected by CPI; Adjusted indicators are controlled by Public Enterprises of Medellín
Power Utilities: 1) CORELCA Holding = 7 Regional Power Distribution Companies + 1 Regional Transmission
Grid + 5 generator plants; 2) EEB = Bogotá Power Company; 3) CVC = Corporación Autónoma del Valle del
Cauca (Empresa del Pacífico SA after 1994); 4) EPM = Empresas Publicas de Medellín
V. THE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
5.1 IFI MANUFACTURING PLANTS
This section analyzes the role plant characteristics, foreign trade variables, and privatization
played in determining firm privatization outcomes for the sample of the IFI firms. The economet-
ric analysis focuses on two key performance variables: plant profitability rates (Lerner indices) and
the translog indices of total factor productivity (TFP) as a proxy of technical change. In that sense,
the econometric exercise therefore searches to shed light regarding plant efficiency and markups
determinants as well as to evaluate the significance of privatization within the model.
The dataset is an unbalanced panel for 28 IFI firms that records information for the 1974-
1998 period. The estimating equation follows the baseline pooled regression model
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where i = 1, ..., n is the number of individuals; t = 1,2,...,T is the number of observations in
each panel; X = firm’s characteristics variables; and Z = ISIC-specific variables. Equation (1)
allows running several types of regression models according to specific assumptions on the
residual variance-covariance matrices and individual effects (α i). In particular, the estimations
relax the assumptions of constant variance across panels, the non-existence of individual effects,
and instrument for endogeneity on right hand side variables.
Plant characteristic variables are related to technology structures, labor composition, and the
firm’s market positioning actions. One expected result is that technology-related variables have a
positive impact on profitability gains. In that sense, plant size, operative scale, quality of raw materi-
als, capital intensity and relative labor productivity result in lower average costs that represent pro-
ductivity gains due to new economies of scale. Plant payroll composition will reflect quality in labor
input. Thus, technicians should lead overall plant labor productivity because skilled workers are
more dynamic and generate productivity spillovers. Administrative employees in turn may generate
inflexibilities that end up punishing profitability. Market positioning variables are those actions that
strengthen a firm’s market share. The firms’ signals are investment rates, the usage of technological
licenses, and product differentiation tactics such as advertising. These actions may persuade rivals to
soften competition and adopt collusive prices but on the other hand, the competitors’ best response
might include hardening competition and setting dumping prices. Hence, there is no expected sign.
Industry specific variables are mostly related to foreign trade. Three main variables are used in
the estimating equations: nominal tariffs, effective protection rates, and Grubel and Lloyd (1975)
indices. The latter is a proxy for trade in differentiated goods.30 Protectionism increases domestic
profitability through entry deterrence. Intraindustry trade, in contrast, implies trade in similar goods
that makes entry a credible threat driving sale prices to second best prices.31 Hence, profitability
decreases. Table 14 displays the main results regarding the markup determinants, which call for
several comments. First, in all cases, the firm’s market share is the robust determinant.32 This is
consistent with the observation that economic openness reduced the firm’s market power and by
this way decreased markups rates. Estimations show that a 10% decrease in market share will reduce
profitability by 9%. Second, the foreign trade variables are robust regressors and show the expected
sign. On average, an increase in 10% in the effective protection rate will rise markups by 4%. In
contrast, if intraindustry trade indices rise 10%, markups will decrease on average 3%. This finding
is important from the perspective of strategic trade policy. Competition through similar goods
forces firms to undertake further specialization strategies to promote efficiency gains in order to
compensate the reduction in the markup rates. Third, plant size and productive efficiency are im-
portant sources of profitability gains. IFI firms are on average seven times larger than their com-
petitors. As a result the observed gains in TFP partially offset the falling trend in firm’s markup. On
30 See Pombo (2001) for a specific study on intraindustry trade and technology applied to the case of Colombia.
31 This idea is similar to the competition behind contestabilility where firms apply the hit and run strategy in order
to capture profits. However, in this case there are significant sunk costs. For theoretical details, see Baumol,
Panzar and Willing (1988) and Baumol (1982). The game theoretical explanation is in Shy (1995).
32 This finding contrast the results of López de Silanes [1999]. One possible reason is the manner that profitabil-
ity is measured. In our case it relied on direct measures of firm output share relative to ISIC specific group
and parametric estimates of demand elasticities rather than financial indicators.34 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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average, if TFP indices raise 10 points they will induce a change of between 0.005 and 0.02 points in
markup rates. Fourth, privatization shows a consistent sign. Privatization induced a 1.2% increase in
profit rates [Eq. 3]. Finally, the foreign investment dummy has the opposite sign. In the context of
the IFI sample this result is not surprising since some firms are located in formerly highly protected
industries that kept lower efficiency levels with respect to parent firms and international standards.33
The econometric results on productive efficiency are displayed in Table 15. Five comments
are worth mentioning. First, plant characteristics are relevant for TFP indices. All equations
show that plant labor productivity, licensing and number of technicians have positive effects. On
average, an increase of 10% in partial labor productivity relative to ISIC specific group raises
TFP by 3.2%. The effect of licensing is the largest. If plants expand by 1% their technological
licensing spending relative to their value added, this will boost productivity between 5.5 to 8.2
times. This finding is consistent with previous results for total manufacturing, and calls attention
to the effectiveness on a short-run basis of using patented licenses for improving productivity
rather than engaging in direct R&D spending.34 The number of technicians is a proxy for labor
input quality. A 10% increase on this variable will improve productivity by 1.12%.
Second, the equation included two variables to capture demand effects on TFP measured
either by the growth in value added or the log-value of firm’s ISIC specific group. The sign
matches with the expected one, which is consistent with the traditional hypothesis derived from
Verdoom law by which growth and productivity are constrained by effective demand. The impact
of aggregate demand is two-fold: domestic and exports demand induce growth and improve
productivity by learning. This in turn leads to improvements in price competitiveness that will
induce higher rates in effective demand [Dixon & Thirlwall (1975)].35
 Third, privatization had a positive effect on productivity where it caused an increase ranging
from 0.27 to 0.50 points on TFP indices. Fourth, the scale and the relative capital partial produc-
tivity coefficients had a negative impact on productivity. The interpretation of this result is not
straightforward. The losses in capital productivity due to over-investment suggest that IFI firms
adjusted capital spending in order to close gaps to industry benchmarks. Fifth, profitability rates
exhibit the opposite effect on TFP, which is not consistent with the self investment-financing hy-
pothesis of endogenous growth models [Romer (1990), Barro & Sala-I-Martin (1995)]. In par-
ticular, one should expect a positive impact since larger profitability rates ease the self financing
of capital equipment and firm’s R&D spending. However, after controlling for fixed effects the
expected sign is recovered. The within regression coefficients show that a 10% increase in mark-
ups will improve TFP by 13 %. The above result suggests that allowing fixed effects for modeling
productivity is a better econometric specification.
33 The automobile assembly industry is the textbook example. Colombian consumers paid for twenty years a
protection premium up to 100% relative to international prices.
34 For details see Pombo (1999). This study highlights two key technology policy issues. First, based on the
results of DNP’s technological survey, panel regressions showed an inverse relation between TFP growth
rates with respect to qualitative information about plant’s R&D infrastructure such as laboratories, prototypes
designing and pilot plants. Second, the effect of getting patented licenses multiples TFP from 1.2 to 1.8 times.
35 Notice that the possible simultaneity bias which arises from running TFP against value added growth is avoided
—partially— here because value added growth refers to overall industry specific group.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 35
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TABLE 14
IFI - EX-POST PERFORMANCE DETERMINANTS
POOLED, FIXED EFFECTS AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LERNER INDEX
Independent Variables Pooled Panel Panel Within Pooled
OLS
1 FGLS FGLS FE 2SLS
1 FE+IV
Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 6
Market share 0.87511 0.93178 0.92644 0.89314 0.96415 0.94587
(0.0470) (0.0263) (0.0255) (0.0305) (0.0311) (0.0341)
Relative partial productivity of labor 0.01948 0.00854 0.00893 0.01080 - -
(0.0039) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0024) - -
Translog Index TFP 0.00006 0.00012 0.00010 0.00007 0.00034 0.00015
(0.00003)* (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00011) (0.00006)*
Size 0.00120 0.00076 0.00094 - - -
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) - - -
Human Capital -0.022627 - - - - -
( 0 . 0 0 5 4 ) -----
Grubel and Lloyd Index -0.05208 -0.02803 -0.03854 -0.01699 -0.04000 -0.01823
(0.0160) (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0156) (0.0095)
Effective protection - 0.03808 0.04326 0.03372 0.08776 0.03285
- (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0079) (0.0136) (0.0080)
Dummy privatization - - 0.01251 - - -
-- ( 0 . 0 0 2 9 ) ---
Dummy foreign investment - - -0.01444 - - -
-- ( 0 . 0 0 3 1 ) ---
Constant 0.008408 -0.022806 -0.021430 -0.003917 -0.047047 -0.001628
Regression Statistics
R2 0.6315 0.6699 0.6249 0.6245
Num of groups 28 28 28 28
Num Obs 613 621 621 621 620 621
Obs per Group: Min 13 13 13 13
                        Max 25 25 25 25
F-test 116.03 238.69 145.15 235.16
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Wald-Chi2(k-1) 2741 2932
[0.0000] [0.0000]








Homocedastic panels yes no no yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables no no no no yes yes
RHS Endogenous Variables TFP TFP
Other Equations in System TFP=F(pplrel,scale,KLrel)
Notes: 1:/ White-Hubert robust heteroscedastic standard errors; std errors appear in parentheses; and p-values in
square brackets. All series are described in the Appendix 2. All regression coefficients are significant at size of
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TABLE 15
IFI FIRMS - EX-POST PERFORMANCE DETERMINANTS
POOLED, FIXED EFFECTS AND INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TRANSLOG INDEX OF TFP
Independent Variables Pooled Panel Panel Within Pooled Pooled
OLS
1 FGLS FGLS FE 2SLS
1 2SLS
1 FE+IV
Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 6 Eq 7
Relative partial productivity of labor 0.3803 0.3633 0.3295 0.2219 0.4811 0.4503 0.2384
(0.0598) (0.0321) (0.0318) (0.0248) (0.0769) (0.0727) (0.0223)
Relative partial productivity of capital -0.0094 -0.0049 -0.0050 - -0.0103 -0.0092 -
(0.0017) (0.001) (0.0009) - (0.0019) (0.002) -
Demand Growth [ISIC-specific] 0.2011 0.0812 0.0977 - 0.1915 0.1722 -
(0.0782) (0.0457)* (0.0444) - (0.0783) (0.0791) -
Scale -0.0316 -0.0190 -0.0175 -0.0136 -0.0262 -0.0247 -0.0185
(0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0035)
Licencing 7.9312 7.9246 8.1922 - 5.3740 4.4938 -
(1.9463) (1.3614) (1.4664) - (2.1096) (2.0138) -
Relative Compensation -0.3283 -0.1031 -0.1135 0.9975 -0.2392 -0.2480 -
(0.0943) (0.0424) (0.0432) (0.0371) (0.1125) (0.1083) -
Advertising Coefficient -2.2255 -1.6442 -1.4812 - -2.2842 -2.2048 -
(0.5537) (0.4407) (0.4422) - (0.5543) (0.5207) -
Log Tecnicians 0.1152 0.1019 0.0778 0.1418 0.1875 0.1840 0.1071
(0.0324) (0.0176) (0.0163) (0.0262) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0215)
Privatization Dummy 0.3626 0.5253 - - 0.2700 0.2757 -
(0.1073) (0.0438) - - (0.1118) (0.1112) -
Lerner Index - -0.4968 -0.4130 1.3185 -2.1912 -2.0258 1.3116
- (0.1570) (0.1502) (0.2899) (0.4225) (0.4223) (0.3626)
Log Value Added [ISIC-specific] - - - 0.3308 - - 0.2702
- - - (0.0462) - - (0.0412)
Relative Capital Labor ratio - - - - - 0.0107 -0.0339
- - - - - (0.0061) (0.0040)
-------
Constant 0.9934 0.614 0.7227 -5.7045 0.8739 0.8563 -4.3417
Regression Statistics
R2 0.1954 0.2708 0.1663 0.2940 0.4747
Num of groups 28 28 28 28
Num Obs 554 554 554 575 554 564 476
Obs per Group: Min 4 4 5 5
                        Max 24 24 25 25
F-test 22.9 40.25 20.7 85.1 54.93
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Wald-Chi2(k-1) 289.6 296.4
[0.0000] [0.0000]





Breuch-Pagan LM stat 158.9
[0.0000]
Variance Matrix Residuals
Homocedastic panels yes no no yes yes yes yes
Instrumental Variables no no no no yes yes yes
RHS Endogenous Variables Lerner Lerner Lerner
Other Equations in System Lerner = F( mshare, grubel, efepro)
Notes: 1:/ White-Hubert robust heteroscedastic standard errors; std errors appear in parentheses, and p-values in
square brackets. All series are described in the Appendix 2. All regression coefficients are significant at size of
0.05, otherwise stated. *: Significant at size of 0.1; ** statistically non-significant; TFP indices at starting year t =
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5.2 POWER PLANTS: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY SCORES
This section reports the results of an econometric analysis of thermal power plants DEA
efficiency scores. The exercise follows a limited dependent variable model because the dependent
variable under analysis is censored by construction. It takes positive values and is bounded at
1.00; thus, the efficient plants will record an efficiency score  it y −−of one. Otherwise, 01 it y ≤<.
The sample might be also truncated because there is knowledge of independent variables if only
it y  is observed. This is particularly important for marginal power producers when the thermal
plants are shutdown because of maintenance, transmission, and generation constraints by which
there is no dispatch. The baseline censored-model follows a linear specification:
  
 0< 1











and the residuals are I.I.D following a normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance.
Equation (2) models efficiency scores as function of plant characteristics, ownership struc-
ture, and regulatory related policy dummies. Plant characteristics include plant age, capital labor
ratio, technology type, and load factor. Controlling by the load factor indicates how marginal a
given producer is.36 A dummy that records all private plants with ones captures ownership. The
regulatory dummy tries to capture the effect of large customer definition. Thus, for each plant
such dummy takes a value of one after 1998 when the lower limit for large clients was set in 0.5
MW/month that implied a jump from 100 to 900 non-regulated users on average. The dataset
includes all observed records from each one of the 32 active thermal plants during the 1995 to
2000 period. Therefore, the dataset is a time series cross-section unbalanced panel with 166
observations. Table 16 displays the parameter estimates from the Tobit analysis. The efficiency
scores in the first two equations are input-oriented measurements under the assumption of
CRTS convex technology. In the third equation efficiency scores take into account the adjust-
ment in capital input by capacity utilization. Such adjustment normalizes plant capacity by load
factor, which means that all producers are treated as if they were out of peak generators.
The reading of those results is the following. First, the equations exhibit high goodness of fit
reported by the R2 of the OLS regressions.37 In particular, the overall effect of the plant character-
istics, ownership structure, and regulatory the policy dummy explain 90% of the efficiency scores





37 In general, the variables included in the Tobit regressions are robust. Residuals are homoscedastic according
to the reported OLS tests. The residuals are not normal, which is associated with the distribution Kurtosis.
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once capital input is already adjusted by capacity utilization, and explains 78% when in the assump-
tion of constant returns to scale is relaxed. Second, technology dummies are robust and statistically
significant in all equations. This implies that new gas-based technologies improve system efficiency,
since they save on fuel consumption. Entrants played a central role in this particular issue. Third,
the load factor is positively related, meaning that there is an effective reduction in the power losses
associated with the frequent and costly plant start-ups. However, the squared is negatively related,
showing that there are decreasing returns to scale at plant full plant capacity.
Fourth, plant age is negatively related, meaning that older plants loose relative efficiency.
Nonetheless, there are positive learning effects that partially offset plant aging given by the
squared of age variable. For instance, the accumulated efficiency loss after 10 years is 17%, but
the learning effect represents a 4.5% efficiency gain. Fifth, regulatory policy has had positive
effects. The regression coefficients indicate an overall efficiency gain of 2.7%. Sixth the exercise
is not conclusive regarding if there are structural differences in productive efficiency due to
ownership. The private ownership dummy turned out not significant once capital input is cor-
rected by capacity utilization and the assumption of constant returns to scale is relaxed [Equa-
tion 3]. This result goes to the same direction that other studies have found. The study of Pollit
(1995) reports regression coefficients statically non-significant for his ownership dummy. Those
regressions are based on a cross-section dataset of 768 thermal power plants for 14 countries.
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has given an overview of the privatization program in Colombia gathering detail
information in a comprehensive way that put this process in context within the global economic
deregulation and market promotion competition strategy. In that sense, the paper offers for first
time a complete description of the privatization experience of the nineties, and also the first in
providing empirical evidence based on an ex-post performance evaluation for the privatized
plants. The paper has explored in deep the cases of IFI manufacturing enterprises and power
plants. These sectors account for 95% of the privatization sales, which without doubt make the
results comprehensive in terms of the overall effects of privatization on firm performance.
The study showed several interesting results. First, IFI firms followed the cycles and trends of
their private competitors across the manufacturing industry. This was proved through the study
measurement of twenty-five indicators of economic performance. The productivity slowdown
of the eighties hit these enterprises harder because they are among the largest capital-intensive
plants. During the nineties these firms underwent to sharp restructuring processes. The large
increase in labor productivity and the adjustment in plant size led to a modest recovery of plant
total factor productivity. The evolution of firm market power and profitability rates indicate that
firms are pricing more competitive and still adjusting to the global economic deregulation and
foreign competition. This study has unbiased measurements because the sample includes firms
where IFI equity was totally transferred to private sector, liquidated firms and enterprises where
the IFI is still a strategic shareholder. Privatization was important as a complementary mecha-
nism that facilitated and speed up plant industrial restructuring. This observation is supported in
econometric results where the privatization dummy turned out to be a robust determinant for
markup coefficients and the Translog indices of total factor productivity.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 39
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TABLE 16
TOBIT REGRESSIONS - LONGITUDINAL DATA
THERMAL PLANTS - EFFICIENCY SCORES (1995-2000)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INPUT-ORIENTED EFFICIENCY SCORES
Pooled Pooled Pooled
Tobit Tobit Tobit
Eq 1 Eq 2 Eq 3




Age -0.0155 -0.0175 -0.0170
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0029)
Age-squared 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
(6E-04) (6E-05) (9.4E-05)
Load Factor 0.4169 0.3700 0.1577
(0.0445) (0.031) (0.049)




Dummy Gas 0.3653 0.3704 0.4170
(0.0118) (0.0122) (0.023)
Dummy Combine Cycle 0.1431
(0.0923)**
Dummy Private Ownership 0.0323
(0.0116)
Dummy Public Ownership -0.0423
(0.0117)
Dummy Regional Market -0.0494
(0.0258)*
Dummy Regulatory Policy 0.0201 0.0229 0.0382
(0.0108)* (0.0112) (0.1762)
Constant 0.4098 0.4593 0.4869
Sigma 0.0660 0.0691 0.1095
Regression Statistics
R2-OLS 0.9104 0.9074 0.7791
Uncensored Obs 155 156 152
Censored Obs 7 10 10
LR~Chi(k-1) 377.3 379.5 225.5
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Tests Residuals
Cook-Weisberg -OLS 0.00 0.04 1.83
[0.9924] [0.8445] [0.1756]
Breuch Pagan -OLS 6.87
[0.4416]
Ramsey-RESET - OLS 1.83 0.59 0.99
[0.1439] [0.6225] [0.4009]
swilk -OLS 4.99 4.67 3.35
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0004]
Notes: Std errors appear in parentheses, and p-values in square brackets; All regression coefficients are significant
at size of 0.05, otherwise stated; *: Significant at size of 0.1; ** statistically non-significant; Efficiency Scores
dataset 1995-2000; Assumptions: Score 1: CRTS, No weights, Input-Oriented, Convex Technology Capital Input
corrected by utilization rates; Score 2: Non-DRTS, No weights, Input Oriented, Convex Technology Capital
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The analysis for the power sector also has important results. The general trends of electricity
contract prices, the evolution of plant entry in thermal generation, and the increasing share of
non-regulated users into the commercial demand suggest that the regulatory reform has been
effective in promoting market competition and system efficiency. The measurement of effi-
ciency scores at plant-level showed that there were important efficiency gains after the reform
because the new plants in thermal generation are gas-based with combining cycle technologies.
The regulatory policy has had positive effects on plant efficiency. The increasing number of
non-regulated users has led generators to offer more competitive prices in order to ensure gen-
eration on contract bases. Last, the relation between ownership and efficiency is not conclusive
for thermal generation once the assumption of constant returns to scale technology is relaxed
and capital input is adjusted by capacity utilization. This result is in accordance to the findings in
international studies on performance and ownership in electric utilities.
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APPENDIX 1
CONCESSIONS INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS WITH ONGOING PRIVATE
INVESTMENT BY 1998
Proyect Name Ownership Proyect Name Ownership
I. Roads Km III. Water and Sanitation
Armenia-Pereira-Manizale 98 Public-Concession ACUACAR-Cartagena Mixed-Capital
Barranquilla-Cienaga 60 Public-Concession
Bogota-Facatativa 41 Public-Concession Triple A-Bquilla Public-Concession
Bogota-Villavicencio 120 Public-Concession
Buga-Tulua-Paila 120 Public-Concession Sta Marta
Carreteras Meta 238 Public-Concession Metro-Agua Public-Concession
Cartagena-Barranquilla 112 Public-Concession
Cortijo-Vino 31 Public-Concession TIBITOC Plant for Public-Concession
Espinal Neiva 150 Public-Concession water treatment
Medellin-RioNegro 195 Public-Concession Bogota Water Company
Patios-Guasca 53 Public-Concession
Sta-Marta Paraguanchon 170 Public-Concession IV. Railroads KMs
Atlantic Line - cargo 965 Mixed-Capital
total 1388
II. Gas-Pipelines Km V. Maritime Ports Number
Contracts Public-Concession
Sebastopol-Medellin 149 Public-Concession 15  and Private
Barranca-B/manga 59 Public-Concession VI. Telecomunications
Sur - Huila 193 Private
Mariquita-Cali 340 Private Mobile Phones Companies
Huila- Tolima 120 Private COMCEL Mixed
CELCARIBE Mixed
Total 861 OCCEL Mixed
CELUMOVIL Private
III. Airports CELUMOVIL COSTA Private
COCELCO Private
Bogota - Second Track 1 Public-Concession
Barranquilla - Aereopuerto 1 Public-Concession
del Caribe S.A
Cartagena-Airport 1 Public-Concession
Sources: Faimboin et al (2001); Bonilla et al (2000); Conpes documents: 2648/1993; 2775/1995; 2928/1997 Law
37 of 1993
Notes: Excludes power sector. Concession Contracts are either Build Operative Maintain Transfer (BOMT) or
Rehabilitation Operative Maintain Transfer (ROMT).44 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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APPENDIX  2
LIST OF IFI ENTERPRISES IN THE STUDY SAMPLE
Num Name Startup ISIC4 ISIC-name
1 ACERIAS PAZ DEL RIO 1947 3710 Iron and Steel basic industries
2 AICSA 1977 3845 Manufacture of aircraft
3 ALCALIS - BETANIA 1951 3511 Basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers
4 ALCALIS-MAMONAL 1967 3511 Basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers
5 ASTIVAR 1974 3841 Ships buildings and repairing
6 CATSA 1978 3116 Grain mill products
7 CCA 1974 3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles
8 CEMENTOS BOYACA 1955 3523 Cement, lime and plaster
9 CEMENTOS RIOCLARO 1986 3692 Cement, lime and plaster
10 CERRO MATOSO 1979 3722 Recovery and founding of tin and nickel
11 COLCLINKER 1974 3692 Cement, lime and plaster
12 CONASTIL 1969 3841 Ships buildings and repairing
13 EMPAQUES DEL CAUCA S A 1965 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
14 FATEXTOL 1988 3220 Wearing apparel
15 FEDERALTEX SA 1987 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
16 FERTICOL 1966 3511 Fertilizers and pesticides
17 FRIGOPESCA SA 1978 3114 Canning, processing of fish, crustacean
18 ICOLLANTAS 1942 3551 Tire and tube industries
19 INGENIO RISARALDA 1978 3118 Sugar, factorie4s and refinements
20 INTELSA SA 1979 3832 Manufacture of radio, tv, and telecom eq.
21 MONOMEROS SA 1967 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides
22 PENWALT 1967 3512 Fertilizers and pesticides
23 PROPAL 1961 3411 Pulp, paper and paperboard
24 QUIBI 1968 3522 Manufacture of drugs and medicines
25 SIMESA 1938 3710 Iron and Steel basic industries
26 SOFASA 1969 3843 Manufacture of motor vehicles
27 SUCROMILES 1973 3511 Basic industrial chemicals except fertilizers
28 TEJIDOS UNICA 1953 3216 Weaving and cotton manufactures
29 TEXPINAL 1973 3211 Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles
30 VIKINGOS DE COLOMBIA S A 1968 3114 Canning, processing of fish, crustacean
Source: DANE-Industrial Directory, IFI-Investment DepartmentCARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 45
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APPENDIX 3
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS: DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGY
The EAM is in practice a Census of manufactures for medium and large enterprises. The
EAM has had three methodological changes: i) 1970-1991, ii) 1992-1993, and iii) 1994 to date.
The changes have been addressed toward: i) the inclusion or exclusion of variables within chap-
ters; ii) the addition or suppression of new information across chapters; iii) the modification in
the format or variables classification criteria; and iv) the rescaling of the sample cohorts.
Some specific examples are the changes of the payroll classification, the inclusion of tempo-
ral workers after 1987, the exclusion of direct exports as a component of firm’s sales, the elimi-
nation of the direct taxes variables after 1991, the redefinition of large enterprise according to
number employees, and the addition of new components for fixed investment after 1992, among
many others.
Despite of the format modifications, the survey has kept the basic variables and structure
across time. The database clean up process took a two-step procedure. First, we worked with the
basic variables of the 1970-1991 survey. Second, all basic series were overlapped and chained
keeping the original definitions of the older survey.38 The manufacturing survey offers five types
of variables:
1. Identification variables: location (blue-park district), ISIC-specific group, firm’s legal capital struc-
ture, and size classification.
2. Labor variables: wages, benefits, permanent and temporal employees, administrative employ-
ees, workers, technicians, and gender statistics.
3. Output-related variables: gross output, value added, intermediate consumption components, in-
dustrial expenditures, and inventories of final products and raw materials.
4. Financial-related variables: fixed assets investment, accounting depreciation, sales, marketing spend-
ing, paid royalties, and other general expenditures variables.
5. Consumption, generation, and sales of electricity.
The survey recorded data for 133 variables form 1970 to 1991. , The survey recorded 380
variables during the years of 1992 and 1993. From 1994 to date, the survey works with 200 vari-
ables. Without any doubt, the 1992-1993 period is the problematic one because the Survey included
information no comparable with previous data. However, the core variables were recorded.
A.2 THE INDICATORS
The EAM database allows measuring the following set of plant characteristics and perfor-
mance indicators for each one of the IFI’s companies.
38 The main problem of the above methodological changes was the modification in the basic plant ID variable
from 1991 to 1992, and 1993. This is troubleshooting if one wants to track the information at plant level. We
ran a cross matching program throughout plant commercial names, recorded at the industrial directories, and
generated an identification key for the ID variables in the 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 Surveys.46 PRIVATIZATION IN COLOMBIA: A PLANT PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
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+ Initial capital formula
where: g: The historic growth rate of the fixed assets gross investment series; δ : Economic
depreciation rate; IB0: Gross investment at initial date
Having K0, the capital stock series are generated using the perpetual inventory method
1(1 ) tt t kk I δ − =− +
Depreciation rates are taken from Pombo (1999).








L = partial labor productivity 1





Wor s = partial labor productivity 2
The TFP indices follow the measurement of Solow’s residual using a translog technology
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Aggregate inputs follow a translog specification in their components. Thus, under CRTS the




() ( l n l n )
2
n
ti t i t i t i t
i
LnX S S x x −−
=
=⋅ − ⋅ − ∑
where: Sit represents the expenditure share of each component of input X observed at time






















AvgL = firm size 2; where L = permanent employment
where j denotes ISIC-specific group.






DRM = quality in intermediate consumption






=Hiring cost; where SB = social benefits and W = wages
























= Advertising rate. This is a indicator for product differentiation, where Adv = adver-
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Y = machinery & equipment investment rate
  i /I i IME = embodied investment rate






















































= = Lerner index (price-cost margin) for firm i
where α i = firm’s market share, and = the demand elasticity. Demand elasticities are taken
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APPENDIX 4
THE POWER SECTOR DATASETS
At present, the power sector statistics in Colombia are split among the following institutions:
i) The National Grid Company (Interconexión Eléctrica S.A); ii) the Mining and Energetic
Planning Unit (UPME); iii) the Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG); iii) the
National Planning Department (DNP); and iv) the Superintendency of Domiciliary Public Ser-
vices (SSPD). As a result, each source has a different format and contents.
The information is sorted out either by plant, utilities, regional electricity markets, regional
geographical provinces, or simply at a countrywide aggregate level. The Table A4.1 describes the
contents of the collected datasets.
TABLE A4.1
COLOMBIA - POWER SECTOR STATISTICS - DATASETS DESCRIPTION
SIVICO The following data available by utility level:
1997-1999
Financial Statements 
Source: SSPD - Income statement
- Balance sheet
Labor Statistics 
- number of employees by sector's activity
- number of employees by occupational category
- number of employees by type of generation
Market composition by type of users
- consumption
- invoicing
- number of subscribers
- average tariffs by users
Results and Performance control process indicators
- quality service indicators
- spending & indebtedness indicators
ISA-Reports Operative Reports of the National Interconnected System
(1995-1999)  - Hydrology
 - Grid Constraints
 - Generation
 - Demand
 - Available effective capacity
The Electricity Spot Market Report
- Pool's prices & contacts
- Total traded amount (GWh)
- Pool's marginal supply prices by type of generation
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Table A4.1 (Cont.)
Colombia - Power Sector Statistics - Datasets description
SIEE The Economic and Energetic Information System is a 
1970-1998 dataset that covers the Latin American Economies energetic
statistics.
Source: OLADE
The SIEE sections are:
- prices
- demand and supply
- energetic Equipment
- environmental impact
- economic + energetic indicators
 -world-wide energetic statistics
FEN Power Sector Historical Financial Statistics. This dataset 
1983-1996 done by the Financiera Electrica Nacional (FEN), offers:
Source: FEN - income statements
- balance sheets
SINSE The power sector national system is a comprehensive
1970-1994 Database. The data is available by utility and regional market.
Source: MME The SINSE chapters are
- energetic balances
- generation and Electricity Demand
- number and type of subcribers
- average tariffs by users
Besides the above datasets there were direct requests to ISA regarding the monthly indicators
of the el Mercado de Energia Mayorista (MEM) since July 1995, and the Thermal Park Dataset. The
crossing of information among ISA’s thermal park dataset, SIVICO, and SINSE allowed collect-
ing the input-output variables by thermal unit that are depict in table A4.2.
In order to make direct inferences of labor input by plant after 1996, a survey was carried out
among the members of the Colombian Generators Association (ACOLGEN). The collected
information allowed distinguishing benchmarks of capacity-labor ratios, which under normal
assumptions of putty-clay technology that coefficient turns out a constant parameter. The data
provided by the power utilities along with SIVICO allowed identifying the number of employees
by thermal plants for the period 1996-1999 given the reported capacity per unit.CARLOS POMBO, MANUEL RAMÍREZ 51
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TABLE A4.2
THERMAL PLANTS - INPUTS AND OUTPUT VARIABLES
Sample Variables Sample Variables
1988-1994 Generation (GWh) 1995-1999 Generation (GWh)
Gross Capacity (MW) Efective Capacity (MW)
Net Capacity (MW) Labor (Number employees)*




Sources: SINSE, ISA, SIVICO
Notes: * Since 1996. Labor information is recorded by power utility and industry activity: Generation, Transmis-
sion and Distribution (SIVICO).
The estimated benchmark labor to capacity ratios by occupational category for a base-tech-
nology thermal plant were:
0.036597 (Directives); 0.151852 (Administrative), and 0.527731(Operative)
For the 1988-1994 period the FEN books recorded some physical variables per power utility,
among them the permanent employment series. Thus, the inference of labor series by the ther-
mal units followed a constant distributing capacity assumption, that is:
Thermal Unit Labor (L1) = [Max Theoretical Thermal Plant Unit Capacity (GWh) / Utility
Available Capacity (GWh)] * Utility total permanent employees
Other formulas were used in order to generate alternative labor series by thermal plants. One
was based on power generation:
Thermal Unit Labor (L2) = [Thermal plant generation (GWh) / Utility Available Capacity in
GWh] * Utility total permanent employees
Now an adjusted L2 series were generated under the assumption:











Rationing Price: MgPhydro > MgPthermal = 1.8;
Without Rationing: MgPhydro < MgPthermal = 0.6
The above coefficients are observed parameters. L1 and L2 were used as the labor input series
in the estimation of plant efficiency scores.